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Abstract
Botnets are large networks of compromised machines under the control of a bot master.
These botnets constantly evolve their defences to allow the continuation of their malicious
activities. The constant development of new botnet mitigation strategies and their subse-
quent defensive countermeasures has lead to a technological arms race, one which the bot
masters have significant incentives to win.
This dissertation analyzes the current and future states of the botnet arms race by
introducing a taxonomy of botnet defences and a simulation framework for evaluating
botnet techniques. The taxonomy covers current botnet techniques and highlights possible
future techniques for further analysis under the simulation framework. This framework
allows the evaluation of the effect techniques such as reputation systems and proof of work
schemes have on the resources required to disable a peer-to-peer botnet. Given the increase
in the resources required, our results suggest that the prospects of eliminating the botnet
threat are limited.
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
The rise in the use of botnets is the result of the shift towards writing malware for profit,
rather than curiosity. These botnets, networks of compromised computers controlled by
a single entity, provide all the functionality bot masters require in order to generate a
profit [22, 43]. Typically this is achieved by performing malicious activities such as sending
spam, performing denial of service attacks and harvesting both personal and financial
information, posing a threat to the security of the Internet and its users [22]. These
botnets are becoming increasingly common, with botnets such as Conficker having millions
of machines at its disposal [14], and botnets such as BlackEnergy performing distributed
denial of service attacks at over 50Gbps [41]. The threats these botnets pose, combined
with the illegal nature of their activities, makes disabling botnets a vital task.
There are two important elements in the operations of botnets, the machines infected
with the botnet software, and the bot master. The machines infected by the botnet are
known as bots, and like most other trojans and viruses, provide no indication to users of
the system that it has been infected. The bot master is the creator of the botnet, and
the one responsible for issuing the botnet with commands. Bots are typically designed to
either wait for these commands to be sent to them, or to attempt to retrieve commands at
regular intervals. Once the command has been received, the bot then executes malicious
instructions contained within.
1.1 Problem Definition
A botnet is like any other business orientated computing system, it requires resources in
order to function, and its correct functioning results in a profit for its creator. Like any
other computing system, security is an important consideration, as without such security
measures in place, there is the possibility that others will disable the system, thereby
ceasing the flow of profit. Usually, those interested in protecting their system are those
on the side of the law, defending themselves against those who are willing to break it.
However, in the case of botnets, these roles have been reversed, as those on the law’s side
are attempting to disable the systems developed by those who are breaking the law.
Using the “bad guy’s” own techniques against them raises significant ethical and legal
questions [32]. Even though such botnet systems are intended to support illegal activity,
attacking them raises a number of complex legal issues, as this involves the modification of
the machines of others without their permission [32]. Even though the owners of infected
machines may give such permission upon request , the geographically distributed nature
of botnet infections makes obtaining this permission for all the machines an impossibility.
While members of the security community have disabled botnets in the past and continue
to do so, some of the methods they have employed have raised significant ethical questions
that have yet to be answered [32].
Regardless of these legal and ethical concerns, botnets have been and continue to be
disabled. Botnets are unique in that while they are capable of performing malicious actions,
the bots within them do not perform such actions unless they are instructed to do so by
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the bot master. The way in which the commands are passed between the bot master and
the bots is known as the botnet’s command and control structure, and disrupting this
has been the most common way of disabling botnets. Without receiving the bot master’s
commands, the bots will cease to perform malicious activities, effectively disabling the
botnet.
While at first disabling this command and control structure proved to be a simple affair,
requiring only the botnet’s central server to be located and shut down [20], this is no longer
the case. Bot masters soon became aware of the threat their creations faced, and reacted
accordingly to better defend them. They modified the techniques their botnets used,
moving from centralised to distributed command and control structures, and employed
new techniques such as cryptography, in order to immunise their creations against known
methods of disabling them. Not to be so easily defeated however, the security community
devised new methods of disabling these new botnets. However, soon enough, the bot
masters had improved their creations once more to protect them against these new threats.
In essence what is occurring between the security community and bot masters is a
technological arms race [6, 21], with each side leveraging new technologies in an attempt to
best their opponent. For bot masters, winning this race results in the continuation of their
botnet’s malicious activities, and the subsequent income they produce. Without further
research into methods of disabling these botnets, the illegal activities and the financial
damage these botnets inflict will continue, as will the profits the bot masters produce.
The unfortunate reality is that right now, there are numerous botnets in operation.
These botnets do not exist unopposed however, as there are members of the security
community that are actively fighting the botnet threat. This demonstrates that while
the bot masters have not yet won the arms race, they are definitely in a commanding
position, making the chances of the security community winning the arms race seem slim.
In order to determine if the arms race can be won, whether or not the bot master’s lead is
widening or closing needs to be determined. This research will achieve this by analysing
the gap between the level of security in current botnets, and the techniques available to
disable them, as well as evaluating how the process of disabling botnets will change in the
near future. While this will allow the prospects of winning the botnets to be evaluated,
significantly more research will be required for this to become a reality.
1.2 Research Contributions
The goal of this research is to determine the current state of the gap between the levels
of security in botnets and the techniques available to fight them, and the prospects of
successfully eliminating the botnet threat. Achieving this goal requires the successful
completion of two sub-goals. The first is to analyze the current state of the botnet arms
race, such that the gap can be successfully determined, and the second is analyze how
this arms race is likely to evolve, to determine whether the arms race can be won. The
following contributions will be made in order to achieve these goals :
• the creation of a taxonomy of the techniques botnets use to defend themselves in
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order to understand the current state of the botnet arms race;
• the design and development of a peer-to-peer botnet simulation framework to allow
the analysis of both current and future botnet techniques; and
• an analysis of the effect trust mechanisms have on the resources required to disable
peer-to-peer botnets to demonstrate the future of this technological gap.
1.3 Research Motivation
While the activities that botnets perform are illegal, the motivation behind disabling them
is not the only fact that they are illegal, but also because of the financial damage they
are capable of causing. While the spam sent by botnets may seem like nothing more than
a time waster, it also wastes computational and bandwidth resources, allows malware to
propagate, and can potentially inflict direct financial damage to the recipient. Although
incredibly few spam emails actually result in a sale, the Storm botnet was still able to
make over $9000 a day from spam alone [23], making it a viable method for bot masters
to earn a profit.
Spam however is not the only method botnets can employ to earn a profit by inflicting
financial damage. When the Torpig botnet was hijacked by researchers for 10 days, the
financial details stolen by the botnet over this period were estimated to be worth up to
millions of dollars [43]. For these stolen accounts to be worth this much on the black market,
it suggests the actual financial damage caused by their theft is even higher. While botnets
can perform denial of service attacks either for extortion or as “muscle for hire” [5, 22],
the damage such attacks cause to the victim is the same. These botnets typically have
over 100,000 machines at their disposal, with some more established botnets reaching into
the millions of machines [46], making incredible amounts of bandwidth available to them.
Distributed denial of service attacks of such magnitude, currently known to be capable of
exceeding 50Gbps [41], are practically impossible to defend against.
In the past the solution to stopping the financial damage that botnets inflict has been
to disable them such that they can no longer function. Over the last few years however
disabling these botnets has become increasingly difficult. The techniques bot masters are
employing to defend their botnets are becoming increasingly sophisticated, evolving in
response to researchers taking their predecessors down [21]. Finding information on these
techniques is difficult however, due to the way in which research into botnets is focused on
analyzing particular botnet variants. This has resulted in a lack of collective information on
the techniques botnets use, and the limited analysis of many of these individual techniques.
The production of a taxonomy aims to collect the currently available information on the
techniques botnets employ into one resource, rather than collection of analyses of individual
botnets as it is today.
Although the security community has been fighting against the techniques employed
by botnets for years now, the threat posed by botnets has not subsided. Spam is still being
sent, and the distributed denial of service capacity of botnets is growing [41], indicating
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that there is no end to the botnet arms race in sight. This suggests that the techniques
currently available to disable botnets are insufficient when compared to the defences that
they employ. Due to the way in which botnet research focuses on individual botnets, such
a collective analysis of botnet techniques is not available. The production of the taxonomy
will produce such an analysis, and allow a confirmation of whether or not this is the case.
Trust metrics, such as reputation systems and proof of work schemes, have been iden-
tified as a possible techniques bot masters will employ to counteract currently available
techniques of disabling peer-to-peer botnets [21]. While these techniques have been dis-
cussed in theory, their effectiveness has yet to be evaluated. The simulation and analysis
of such trust metrics in a peer-to-peer botnet will not only allow their impact on the abil-
ity of the security community to disable botnets to be evaluated, but it will also provide
an insight into the future of the botnet arms race. This insight, when combined with the
knowledge of the current state of the botnet arms race, will allow the prospects of defeating
the bot masters permanently to be evaluated.
1.4 Dissertation Summary
The dissertation begins with Section 2 reviewing the current literature to provide a back-
ground for this research. This covers the fundamentals of current botnets and their oper-
ations, as well as a review of the literature relating to the contributions made.
Section 3 introduces a taxonomy of the techniques botnets currently use to defend
themselves, as well as the future techniques botnets are likely to implement. This is
accompanied by a description and analysis of the use of each of these techniques, outlining
the benefits it provides the botnet with as well as the technique’s success. In addition
this will provide an overview of the current state of the botnet arms race, a key piece of
information lacking from the available botnet literature.
Section 4 describes the approach of an experiment into the effect the use of trust mech-
anisms will have on the resources required to disable peer-to-peer botnets. A suitable
simulation environment was not available for this purpose, and as such this required the
development of a peer-to-peer botnet simulation framework, the details of which are ex-
plained in Section 5. This simulation framework allowed the effects of the use of reputation
systems and proof of work schemes in a peer-to-peer botnet to be examined, the results
of which are presented and discussed in Section 6. The results of these experiments al-
lowed for the first time the impact of such trust metrics on the capability of the security
community to disable such botnets.
The dissertation is concluded in Section 7, which summarises the contributions and
their findings, as well discussing future research possibilities.
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Botnets and the bot masters behind them pose a serious threat to the security of the
Internet and its users [22]. Each botnet is effectively an army of compromised machines
acting out the bot master’s commands, which are received through what is known as the
botnet’s command and control structure [22]. While the actions that botnets perform are
malicious in nature, as long as there is money to be made from performing such activities,
bot masters will continue to do so [5]. It is for this reason that bot masters are continually
evolving the defense mechanisms they employ, to avoid having their botnets fall victim to
new countermeasures [50] and therefore lose the profits they produce. In order to be able
to disable botnets, it is important to understand how these defensive mechanisms function,
so that they can be effectively countered [21, 47].
While a brief overview of some of the techniques botnets employ is contained in this
section, the taxonomy produced in Section 3 provides a much more detailed analysis of
botnet defence techniques.
2.1 Disabling Botnets
Due to the fact that botnets are highly distributed systems, they rely on the effective
communication between bots and the bot master in order to function. The bots provide
resources for the bot master to use, and the bot master sends commands to the bots to use
those resources. Without either one of these, the botnet is unable to function. This means
that there are potentially three points of attack when attempting to shut the botnet down,
the command and control structure, the botnet traffic and the infected machines [29]. The
typical approach that has been used is to prevent the bots from receiving the commands by
disabling the command and control structure, using a process known as botnet tracking [20].
2.1.1 Botnet Tracking
Botnet tracking consists of three main steps, the first of which is to acquire a copy of the
botnet code, so that it can be analyzed [20]. There are numerous ways in which this can be
achieved, but the most successful method of acquiring the botnet code is to use machines
known as honeypots [51]. These honeypots are machines set up such that they appear to
be regular machines, but are actually configured to be infected [51]. By severely restricting
the outbound traffic from these machines, it allows samples of botnet code to be acquired
without the risk of the infection spreading. Once a botnet sample has been acquired, it
is typically analyzed within a virtual machine, due to the ideal monitoring and isolation
capabilities virtualisation provides [6].
The goal of acquiring and analyzing the botnet code is to facilitate the second step of the
botnet tracking process, which is infiltrating the botnet to learn the details of its command
and control structure [20]. This is achieved by crafting a special botnet client using the
knowledge gained through analysis, which is then used to connect to the botnet’s command
and control servers. While this allows the protocol of the botnet to be understood, it more
8
2 Literature Review
importantly allows to central servers behind the botnet to be identified. This information
then allows the third and final step of the botnet tracking process to be undertaken, which
is to take the botnet’s central command and control servers offline, typically by alerting
law enforcement. With the command and control servers offline, the botnet is no longer
able to function, and therefore has been successfully disabled.
2.1.2 Disabling Peer-to-Peer Botnets
This approach was very successful against the early botnets, as they relied on Internet
Relay Chat (IRC) for their command and control structure [22]. The use of IRC meant
the command and control structure relied on a single central server, which when shut
down would completely disable the botnet. Newer botnets however, such as Storm and
Conficker, employ peer-to-peer command and control schemes [20, 28], rather than the
centralised methods of the past. By having a distributed command and control system
rather than relying on a single server, these botnets are not affected by the botnet tracking
process described above, as there are no central command and control servers to disable.
As a result, different techniques must be used to disable peer-to-peer botnets, even
though the end goal of disrupting the command distribution is the same. For peer-to-peer
botnets built on file-sharing protocols, such as the Storm botnet, bots receive commands
by downloading particular files from the file-sharing network [20]. This allows the pollution
attack to be used, whereby large numbers of fake versions of the commands are distributed
onto the network, preventing the bots from obtaining the real commands. Although the
term attack is used to describe this action, disabling a botnet is seen as a positive action
from an ethical standpoint, and only has negative connotations to the owner of the botnet.
Other peer-to-peer botnets however do not rely on file-sharing protocols, and instead
directly send the commands between peers using custom made protocols. Such botnets are
not vulnerable to pollution attacks, as this relies on exploiting the weaknesses of the file-
sharing protocol. Another method that can be used is the sybil attack, where a large number
of fake peers are introduced onto the network in order to manipulate the communications
between peers [20]. This particular method is explained in more depth in Section 4.2, as it
was used extensively in the experiments on the effectiveness of trust metrics in peer-to-peer
botnets.
While studies have been performed on the effectiveness of the sybil attack on peer-
to-peer botnets, these studies have dealt with botnets based on file-sharing protocols,
such as the Storm botnet [9, 48]. These two papers, by Davis et al. [9] and Wang et
al. [48], provide conflicting results as to which is the best strategy for disabling the Storm
botnet. This is a perhaps a result of the complexities in both analyzing the file-sharing
network mathematically, as Wang et al. [48] did, and simulating the botnet as Davis et
al. [9] did. Whatever the cause of the conflicting conclusions, the end result is that there
is substantial confusion as to the best method of conducting such sybil attacks against
peer-to-peer botnets.
File-sharing protocol peer-to-peer botnets differ significantly in the way they receive
commands compared to custom protocol peer-to-peer botnets. Whereas botnets using
9
2 Literature Review
file-sharing protocols employ a pull approach, where the bot is responsible for retrieving
commands, custom protocol botnets employ a push approach, where the bot is sent com-
mands directly. As a result of this difference, the results of the studies of sybil attacks on
the Storm botnet cannot be directly applied to the experiment described in Section 4. One
potentially useful result however is the optimal sybil-to-bot ratio of 1:10 provided by Davis
et al [9]. Although this may not prove to be the optimal ratio in the custom peer-to-peer
protocol botnet, it serves as a reasonable starting point for this parameter.
2.2 Botnet Defence Techniques
In response to having their botnets disabled, bot masters started to implement new and
improved techniques in order to defend their creations. Typically, these techniques were
in direct response to the methods used to disable previous botnets, either updating the
technique to close the previous vulnerability, or employing an entirely new technique to
remove the vulnerability completely. Even if a bot master’s previous botnet has been shut
down, there is nothing stopping them from simply upgrading their botnet and starting
again.
An example of this is the bot master behind the Storm botnet, who is rumored to also
be behind the Waledac botnet [4]. The Storm botnet was vulnerable to several attacks
due to the peer-to-peer file-sharing protocol upon which it was based [20], and eventually
disappeared entirely, with the Storm servers reporting the message “Go away, we’re not
home”. Soon after the Storm botnet disappeared, the Waledac botnet appeared, a botnet
which shared many similarities with the Storm botnet, a fact that when combined with
the correlation in time lines led many to believe that was in fact an updated version of
the Storm botnet [4]. Although Waledac and Storm share very similar command and
control structures, Waledac removes the file-sharing protocol and replaces it with a custom
peer-to-peer protocol, nullifying the previously identified attacks against it.
Even with these improvements however, Waledac is still vulnerable to other techniques
to disable the botnet, particularly due to its lack of command authentication [29]. This
lack of command authentication was also present in the Storm botnet and contributed to
its downfall [20], demonstrating that the bot master behind Storm and Waledac was simply
doing the minimum required to protect their botnet. Other botnets, such as Conficker,
a botnet estimated to have millions of machines at its disposal [14, 40], is much more
comprehensive in defending itself against attempts at disabling the botnet.
In addition to providing command authentication to prevent against the techniques used
to disable the Storm botnet, Conficker employs numerous other defensive techniques [14,
28]. Conficker, like the Torpig botnet, originally used a technique known as domain flux
for the command and control structure [43, 14]. When Stone-Gross et al. [43] discovered
a vulnerability in Torpig’s implementation of domain flux that allowed them to hijack the
botnet, the next version of Conficker modified their implementation of domain flux to block
the possibility of a similar hijacking [14].
While this was a major vulnerability in Conficker, the bot master of Conficker has been
meticulous in securing their botnet, patching even the most minor of vulnerabilities. As
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part of its digital signatures, Conficker employed the MD6 cryptographic hash function [29].
When a vulnerability in this algorithm was identified, the next version of Conficker immedi-
ately fixed the vulnerability in this algorithm [40], even though this particular vulnerability
was not considered to be exploitable [29].
The lengths that bot masters are willing to go to defend their botnets demonstrates
just how motivated bot masters are to win the botnet arms race. It is for this reason
that botnets have evolved from the original simple IRC controlled botnets, to much more
complex systems, employing numerous best practice security techniques. While a few
techniques that bot masters currently employ have been mentioned in this section, it is
just the tip of the iceberg in regards to the range of defensive techniques employed by
different botnets.
2.2.1 Research into Botnet Defences
Since the first IRC botnets appeared, the dominant method of study has been analyzing
single botnets, or single techniques that they implement. This practice can still be observed
today, such as the analyses of Conficker [14, 28, 40, 44] and the peer-to-peer protocol used
by Storm [9, 20, 48]. Initially this approach was ideal, as there were few variations in the
techniques employed between botnets, and few botnets active at one time. Given that the
range of botnet defence techniques has expanded to well beyond the point where a single
botnet can implement them all, and the sheer number of botnets active at any one time,
this approach no longer accurately represents the full range of defensive botnet techniques.
While the analysis of particular botnets is still important, there is a growing need for the
collective analysis of the techniques that botnets employ, to allow the better understanding
of what needs to be done to disable them. Although some work has been done in this area,
such as the taxonomy of botnet structures by Dagon et al. [8], these are still limited to
specific subsets of botnet techniques. It is for this reason that the taxonomy of botnet
defence mechanisms presented in Section 3 was produced. This taxonomy attempts to
collect the results of currently available research in order to provide an overview of the
techniques botnets employ to defend themselves. In essence it is an amalgamation of
the results produced by analysing individual botnets and botnet techniques, in order to
allow the categorisation and evaluation of both current and future techniques that botnets
employ.
2.3 Studying Botnets
A major component of botnet tracking is the analysis of the botnet infection [20]. Typically,
this is achieved by performing a runtime analysis of the botnet code, by executing the
botnet code in an isolated environment and recording information such as the modifications
it makes to the system and the network traffic it generates [22]. As previously mentioned,
the use of virtualisation is an ideal technique for achieving this [6], as it easily and rapidly
provides the isolation and monitoring required to achieve this task. Although some botnets
implement techniques known as virtualisation detection in order to prevent analysis under
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virtual machines [3], steps to defeat these techniques can be taken [6]. After the runtime
analysis, further steps can be taken to learn more about the botnet if necessary, through
the use of time consuming techniques such as reverse engineering [22].
While such an approach is suitable for studying a single botnet infection, it does not
allow the study of botnets at a larger scale. Such study of multiple botnet infections
is sometimes necessary in order to answer further questions about botnet structure and
behaviour [3], particularly when more complex command and control structures are used.
In these scenarios, the study of an individual botnet infection is not suitable, and an
artificial botnet of some sort must be created in order to facilitate further analysis.
2.3.1 Simulating Botnets
One approach for creating artificial botnets is to run the botnet code on multiple ma-
chines, on a secure and isolated network. While this is a logical approach when samples
of the botnet code are available, there are numerous challenges associated with such an
approach [3]. One major problem is the scaling of such experiments, as each infection
requires a full operating system environment in order to function. In the research done by
Barford and Blodgett [3] into this approach, they were able to achieve five bots per host
machine, making this approach limited to very small scale simulations. Apart from the
machines required to run the bots, there are numerous other support services required for
the bots to function, such as DHCP and DNS. One crucial service however is any code
required to sustain the botnet’s command and control structure, which unlike individual
botnet code, is unlikely to be readily available. Even in the case of peer-to-peer botnets
such as Storm, there are still backend servers run by the bot master [4], which the botnet
cannot run without.
These constraints make simulating botnets by running actual botnet code a very diffi-
cult approach. Another possibility is to synthetically simulate the botnet, by abstracting
out the behaviour relevant to the research, such as the command and control structure.
This approach was used by Davis et al. [9] on their study into the best way to conduct
a sybil attack against the Storm botnet. The simulation was performed by modeling the
file-sharing network used in Storm using graph theory [9], allowing them to perform experi-
ments with botnets of over 20,000 nodes, making it far superior in this regard to simulating
actual botnet infections.
Given the scale at which synthetic simulations can be run, this approach was a more
desirable option for the experiments detailed in Section 4. However, given that the botnet
to be simulated was a hypothetical one, outlined in a paper by Holz et al. [21], no botnet
code existed to allow simulating the botnet through the first approach, unless such code
was created. Implementing real botnet code which infected actual machines was something
that was not only beyond the scope of this research, but highly unethical if such code was
to escape confinement. It was for this reason that the synthetic simulation option was
chosen.
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2.3.2 Modeling Techniques
As previously mentioned, Davis et al. [9] employed graph theory for their simulation, as
they were able to model the file-sharing protocol used in the Storm botnet in this way. This
was an ideal approach, as it allowed them to use the concepts in graph theory as a measure
of how well botnets received commands [9]. The problem inherent in such an approach
however is that it relies on the fact that the system to be simulated can be modeled using
graph theory. For the simulation detailed in Section 4, such an approach may have been
possible. However, given the reliance of the protocol on the stateful information stored by
the bot, particularly the peers it knows about, and then the added complexities involved
in modeling the trust metrics to be analysed, it was decided that the model would have
been overly complex and likely be prone to error.
This therefore required that a different method of simulating the botnet be chosen.
Agent-based models have shown to be a useful tool in the modeling of peer-to-peer net-
works, and can even effectively model complex systems where the network is only a part
of the system [39]. An agent in an agent-based model is a self-contained individual with
rules to govern its behaviour, living in an environment in which it interacts with other
agents [31]. In botnet terms, an agent is a bot within the botnet, and the environment
is the collection of all the bots in the botnet. While typically in an agent-based model
agents have the capacity to learn [31], the closest a bot in a botnet will come to this is
keeping track of the peers that it knows about. Given that agent-based models are about
working at a higher level of abstraction [39], this approach is an ideal method of modeling
and simulating botnets. While agent-based modeling tools were not used in the simulation
detailed in Section 4, the agent-based modeling methodology was still employed.
2.4 Conclusion
Bot masters are highly motivated to fight the botnet arms race. Without sufficient re-
search into the techniques that botnet’s use to defend themselves, appropriate methods of
countering them cannot be found, and consequently, the botnets that employ them cannot
be disabled. Research into these techniques does not just cover the techniques used by
an individual botnet, but the techniques used by botnets on the whole. Given the highly
distributed nature of many of these techniques, particularly those that deal with the com-
mand and control structure, the analysis of individual infections is not suitable. For this
reason, methods of simulating botnets employing these techniques are required, so that
they can be efficiently studied. Without formulating countermeasures to the techniques
that botnets use, such that they can be effectively disabled, the security community will
have no way of fighting the botnet threat, and without a way of fighting the botnet threat,
the bot masters will have already won.
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3 Taxonomy
A botnet is a service provided by the bot master, which performs malicious activities
in order to generate a profit. Just like with any legitimate service, the profit generated
by the service is reliant on the continued operation of the service. Given the nature of
such a service’s activities however, there are numerous parties actively trying to disable
that service, including researchers, law enforcement, anti-malware vendors, technology
companies and even other bot masters. For this reason, the security of an illegitimate
service is crucial to its continued success.
Making the bot master’s service as secure as possible was therefore the logical decision.
This has lead to the evolution of botnets from being basic centralised systems, employing
few if any security measures, to incredibly complex distributed systems, employing numer-
ous best security practices. As the techniques the bot masters employed to defend their
botnets evolved, so too did the anti-botnet techniques of their adversaries. With each side
constantly leveraging new technologies in order to best their opponent, this has lead to
the creation of a technological arms race [6, 21], one which the bot masters have plenty of
financial motivation to win.
Given that there are currently numerous botnets still in operation, it would seem that
the bot masters are winning. The fact that these botnets continue to operate suggests that
the defensive mechanisms bot masters employ are superior to the offensive capabilities of
their adversaries. This taxonomy aims to provide a complete analysis of the techniques
bot masters currently employ in their botnets, as well as the techniques that they are
likely to employ in the near future. The completion of this analysis will provide a snapshot
of the current state of the botnet arms race, allowing the magnitude of the gap between
botnet technologies and the techniques to counter them to be determined. This completed
taxonomy and the insight it provides will form one of the major contributions of this
research.
3.1 Taxonomy Structure
This taxonomy provides a means of classifying the defensive techniques that bot masters
employ, based on how the use of the technique benefits the bot master. The result of
applying this taxonomy to the range of techniques that bot masters currently employ, and
those they are likely to employ is shown in Figure 1.
In order to disable a botnet, the security community must progress through three main
phases, detecting the botnet, analysing the botnet and disabling the botnet. To a bot
master, the continued operation of their malicious botnet service relies on preventing the
security community from completing these three phases, in particular that of disabling
their botnet. For this reason, the highest level of classification in the taxonomy is which of
these three phases the technique employed by the bot master aims to prevent. These three
major categories are the prevention of botnet detection, the prevention of botnet analysis,
and preventing loss of botnet control.
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the process that bot masters place the most emphasis on
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preventing is the security community disabling their botnet. While the presence of nu-
merous techniques to prevent detection and analysis show that security through obscurity
is a significant portion of a botnet’s defence mechanism, the fact that almost half the
techniques fall under preventing the loss of botnet control demonstrates that preventing
attempts to disable the botnet is the most important part. This demonstrates that bot
masters understand that security through obscurity will only protect their botnets for so
long, and that once their botnets have been discovered and analysed, the botnet’s resilience
to attempts to disable it will determine its lifespan.
Each of the techniques featured in the taxonomy were analysed not only to categorise
them, but to determine whether the technique provides bot masters an edge in the techno-
logical arms race. This allows a decision as to whether or not the bot masters are leading
the arms race to be made. The techniques analysed appear in the same order as they
appear in Figure 1.
3.2 Prevention of Botnet Detection
Techniques to prevent botnet detection fall into three main categories, the first of which
is preventing the detection of the botnet’s existence as a whole. Once a botnet has been
detected, it will be analysed and soon enough attempts to disable the botnet will be made.
To the bot master, this means that the longer the botnet can operate undetected, the more
well established and the more profits will be generated from it before such attempts are
made.
Once the botnet’s existence has been detected, the focus shifts to preventing the detec-
tion of botnet traffic, and preventing the detection of the botnet’s infection. Preventing
the detection of botnet traffic prevents the traffic from being filtered or blocked, allowing
bots within the botnet to continue operating in the presence of firewalls and other network
security appliances. By preventing the botnet infections from being detected, it delays the
creation of anti-malware signatures for the botnet, allowing the botnet to continue prop-
agating to new systems and persisting on already infected systems. Like preventing the
detection of the botnet as a whole, to the bot master preventing the detection of botnet
traffic and infections also allows the botnet to generate more profit and better establish
itself.
Techniques that exhibit the following features can be classified as preventing botnet
detection:
• aims to prevent detection of the botnet as a whole or some aspect therein;
• provides little or no benefit to the botnet once the implementation of the technique
has been analyzed; and
• provides no resistance against attempts to disable the botnet.
The following sections describe the techniques that fall under this category.
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of Botnet Defence Mechanisms
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3.2.1 Preventing Detection of Botnet Existence
Techniques that fall under this category are those that explicitly aim to hide the botnet’s
existence from the security community. This is in contrast to techniques that provide this
as a side effect, such as preventing the detection of botnet traffic or botnet infections.
This distinction is required as techniques that hide the botnet as a side effect continue to
provide fulfill their main purpose after the botnet has been discovered, whereas techniques
under this category do not. Once the botnet has been discovered, techniques to prevent the
detection of the botnet’s existence can no longer fulfill their main purpose, but still may
provide other minor benefits to the botnet, such as hindering the acquisition of samples to
analyse in blacklisting IP addresses.
Features that are exhibited by techniques in this category are:
• aims to hide the botnet’s existence from the security community; and
• provides little or no benefit to the botnet once it has been discovered.
Techniques in this category:
• Blacklisting IP Addresses; and
• Hiding Command and Control in Web 2.0 Applications.
Each of these techniques are now described in detail.
Blacklisting IP Addresses
IP address blacklisting is the process of blocking traffic to and from machines known to
be “bad”, and is commonly used to block machines known to send spam [4]. To a botnet,
these “bad” machines are honeypots, specially configured machines that are designed to be
infected [51]. These honeypots allow the code that infects them to be analysed, a practice
which has proven very successful in the past against botnets [20, 51]. Avoiding such
machines is therefore crucial for ensuring that a botnet remains undetected. In an attempt
to avoid these honeypots, Conficker has implemented IP blacklisting [28, 44] in order to
block connections to “bad” machines run by known adversaries [44]. The blacklist used
by Conficker contains the IP address ranges of numerous companies, including Microsoft,
anti-malware vendors and security companies, in order to avoid detection [28]. This process
of actively avoiding detection was added in a later version of Conficker, showing evidence
of the author’s continuing response to the developments of the whitehat community [28].
Such a technique relies heavily on the fact that the IP addresses of honeypots are known in
advance, and can be avoided by running honeypots on IP addresses outside of the known
corporate IP address space.
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Hiding Command and Control in Web 2.0 Applications
Hiding command and control structures in web 2.0 applications is the process of using freely
available legitimate web services in order to command the botnet. This method is similar
to the first botnets using freely available Internet Relay Chat (IRC) servers as command
and control, except that these web 2.0 applications, such as Facebook and Twitter, are used
by millions each day. This means that unlike using IRC, which made botnet traffic easily
identifiable [5], using these web 2.0 applications makes botnet traffic indistinguishable from
legitimate traffic. Botnets have recently started to take advantage of this fact, with various
botnets utilising Facebook [30], Google AppEngine [36] and Twitter [37] as command and
control structures. Typically this is achieved by using these services to post links that
the bots follow in order to download updates or receive further commands [30, 37]. While
using these services makes the command and control structure and its traffic hard to find
or detect, once found the centralised nature of such services makes them easy to take down.
However, given the ease with which accounts on such services can be set up, finding and
shutting down all of them could pose a significant challenge.
3.2.2 Preventing Detection of Botnet Traffic
The distributed nature of botnets makes the network traffic between the bots and the bot
master of vital importance, as without it the botnet cannot function. For this reason, it is
important to the bot master to design the traffic in such a way that it cannot be blocked
or filtered during transit, in order to ensure that bots can receive and execute commands.
Preventing the detection of botnet traffic is necessary due to the fact that many bots will
reside in networks behind security mechanisms such as firewalls and intrusion detection
systems, which when configured correctly will block the botnet traffic.
Techniques in this category have the following features:
• construct or manipulate the traffic in order to avoid detection; and
• provides no confidentiality for the contents of the traffic at the source and destination.
Techniques in this category:
• Traffic Encryption;
• Hiding Communications using Steganography; and
• Command and Control over HTTP.
These techniques are now described in more detail.
Traffic Encryption
Botnet traffic is encrypted in order to ensure that network traffic flow based detection
systems will be unable to successfully block the botnet traffic [47]. If botnet communica-
tions are not encrypted, there is the risk that the contents will be able to be identified in
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transit, allowing such communications to be blocked [21]. Typically botnets achieve traffic
encryption by encrypting their traffic with static keys embedded in their binaries, as the
Waledac botnet does [4]. While such a basic method of encryption does not provide any
confidentiality for the traffic, it transforms the characteristics of the traffic sufficiently so
that it cannot be detected in transit. This makes filtering encrypted botnet traffic based
on the content of packets technically infeasible, but does not rule out the possibility of
filtering the traffic based on the unencrypted parts of the packet.
Hiding Communications using Steganography
Steganography is a form of security through obscurity, where messages are hidden within
other content such that only the sender and receiver are aware of the message’s existence.
While steganography has been around for a long time, previously it had been a technique
that botnets had yet to take advantage of. This however is changing, with the Cimbot [49],
Monkif [34] and Waledac [4] botnets including steganography in their communications.
Given the availability of sophisticated steganography tools however, the methods used by
these botnets are incredibly primitive by comparison. Both the Cimbot and Monkif botnets
simply use a valid image header, followed by a weakly encrypted set of instructions [34, 49].
As a result, the data will not parse to display a valid image, simplifying the detection of
such communications [34]. Waledac makes a slightly more substantial effort by appending
the poorly encrypted instructions to the end of a valid image file [4]. Unlike the method
employed by the other two botnets, this method will allow the communications to render
a valid image. However, the fact that there is data appended after the end of the image
makes such communications easily detectable. While it appears that the steganographic
techniques employed by botnets are in their infancy, there is the possibility that more
sophisticated techniques are in use that have yet to be detected.
Command and Control over HTTP
While botnets started off using protocols such as Internet Relay Chat (IRC) for their
communications, a growing number of botnets are starting to use HTTP for their com-
munications [17]. The most obvious advantage that command and control over HTTP
gives is stealth, as HTTP accounts for a high percentage of internet traffic [4]. This allows
botnet traffic to blend in with normal web traffic, making it more difficult to “separate
the wheat from the chaff” [17]. A slightly less obvious advantage of using HTTP is that
it allows botnet traffic to bypass firewalls and other security measures [4, 12, 29]. This
not only guarantees that the bots within the botnet will be able to receive commands,
but also ensures the added botnet traffic will not trigger alarms on Intrusion Detection
Systems [4]. While currently only Clampi [12] and Waledac [4] are the major botnets to
use this technique, command and control over HTTP will likely become the standard for
botnets in the near future. Without knowing the characteristics of the botnet traffic in
advance, it will be almost impossible to detect.
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3.2.3 Preventing Detection of Botnet Infection
Preventing the detection of the infection consists of two parts, preventing the act of in-
fecting the machine from being detected, and preventing the existence of the infection on
the machine from being detected. If the infection process can be detected, it prevents
the bot master from infecting any more machines, meaning that as existing infections are
removed, the botnet’s population will slowly die out. If the presence of the infection on
the machine can be detected, the chances of that infection being removed increase signif-
icantly, especially if the machine is running anti-malware software. For this reason, it is
in the best interests of the bot master to prevent the detection of the infection process
and the infection’s existence, as the more machines that can be infected and the longer
these infections persist, the larger the population of the botnet and the more profits it will
produce.
Techniques to prevent the detection of the infection process or existence exhibit the
following qualities:
• circumvent detection methods by security programs or processes; and
• provide no functionality to the botnet other than increasing the persistence or preva-
lence of infections.
Techniques in this category:
• Code Polymorphism;
• Rootkits;
• Disabling Anti-Malware Software; and
• Third-Party Malware Loader.
The rest of this section will now describe these techniques in more detail.
Code Polymorphism
Code polymorphism is the process of mutating the malware code such that it retains the
same functionality, but is able to thwart signature based detection [45]. Such techniques are
employed because anti-malware software typically uses signature based detection methods,
and therefore require malware signatures in order to protect a system [29]. In order to
mutate the malware code, techniques such as self-encryption and semantics-preserving
code manipulation are used [26], both of which preserve the functionality of the code yet
give it different statistical properties. Such techniques can be used once, prior to the
distribution of the malware, or continuously, by employing them each time the malware is
sent over a network [26]. Regardless of the techniques used, the end result is evading the
signature based detection used by anti-malware software.
Recently, this process of avoiding signature based detection has been taken one step
further. Online services have appeared for malware authors that will take a malicious
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binary and check them against numerous anti-malware engines, informing the author if it
is detectable [25, 33]. These sites are similar to those that already exist to check files for
infection, except that they guarantee to not share the results with anti-malware software
vendors [25, 33]. This provides malware authors with a risk free method of checking if
their malware can be detected, and even providing information as to why the malware is
detected when possible [33]. The continued operation of such sites poses serious threats to
the effectiveness of anti-malware software, effectively guaranteeing that new malware will
spread unhindered until new signatures are developed.
Rootkits
While rootkits were originally intended to be a collection of tools that may be needed after
compromising a system, they place a particular focus on tools to hide the attacker from
the system [27]. As such, any malware that uses components to modify the operating
system in order to prevent detection are now classified as rootkits [4]. Rootkits are not
only designed to hide the malware from users of the system, but from security tools and
other utilities that might reveal its existence and activity [22]. The nature of rootkits make
them an invaluable tool for preventing the detection of botnet infections, and as a result
have made them an expected feature of botnets or any other malware. While tools exist to
find rootkits, the “man in the middle” nature of rootkits means that there is no guarantee
that the results of such tools will be reliable [27, 42].
Disabling Anti-Malware Software
Anti-Malware software is designed to prevent the execution of malware such as botnets,
which makes disabling such software a high priority for bot masters. Typically a botnet
will contain a list of process names that it deems a threat to its existence, which typically
includes anti-malware software [5, 44]. Upon finding a process in the list that is running,
the bot attempts to terminate the running process [5, 44, 50]. While this is a simple
technique, it is still very effective [22]. If the botnet is able to disable the anti-malware
software in this way, it means that the anti-malware software is incapable of detecting the
botnet malware. Another less intrusive method of disabling the anti-malware software is
to take advantage of this fact and instead block the software from downloading updates.
This will prevent the anti-malware software from detecting the botnet infection even after
such detection signatures have been created by the anti-malware software vendor [22].
In addition, unlike simply killing the anti-malware software, blocking updates will trick
uneducated users of the computer into believing that their system is still protected. Either
way, disabling anti-malware software to avoid detection is a step an increasing number of
botnets are performing, and can only be prevented by having the anti-malware software
capable of detecting such attacks.
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Third-Party Malware Loader
Malware loaders are pieces of malicious software that are used to distribute other malicious
software, usually those that do not have a propagation method of their own. An example
of this is the Pushdo botnet, which instead of featuring worm-like behaviour or spamming
links to executables (like a normal botnet), relies on being installed onto machines by other
malware [11]. This works by having a piece of malware serve as a distribution platform
for other malware, providing a “pay per install” service [35], which can provide numerous
advantages for a bot master. These include the fact that the complexity of the botnet
is reduced by not having a propagation method, the chances of detecting the botnet are
lower since the malware loader is already running on the system, and the botnet can use
the malware loader in order to deliver updates.
Currently, such malware loaders have been known to install variants of the Pushdo,
Storm, Srizbi and Rustock botnets [11]. In addition, some of these malware loaders have
been seen installing other malware loading platforms [35]. What this means is that it is
effectively impossible to shutdown any of these malware loaders or the malware they install
without shutting down all the malware loaders at the same time [35]. If only a single part
of this system is shut down, the remaining malware loaders have the capability to install
new or updated malware to take its place [35]. This makes shutting down these malware
loaders a significant challenge, both technically and logistically, making them a potent
force in the botnet arms race.
3.3 Preventing Botnet Analysis
The goal of preventing the analysis of botnet code is to prevent adversaries from finding
vulnerabilities they can exploit to disable the botnet. Since for the botnet to function the
code and communications must be understood by the machine at some point in time, it is
impossible to indefinitely prevent the analysis of the botnet. However, this does not mean
that analysing the botnet has to be easy, and there a few methods that bot masters can
implement to make this process as difficult as possible.
Features of techniques that prevent the analysis of the botnet:
• hinders analysis even when techniques used are known and well understood; and
• provides little or no functionality other than preventing analysis.
Techniques in this category:
• Code Obfuscation;
• Virtualisation Detection;
• Command Encryption using Secret Sharing Schemes; and
• Honeypot Awareness.
The techniques that fall under this category are described below.
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Code Obfuscation
Code obfuscation is a technique similar to code polymorphism, that instead of modifying
the code to avoid detection, modifies the code to prevent reverse engineering by making it
as difficult as possible to understand. No matter what is done to the code of a program,
it needs to be able to run on the computer, so it must be readable by the computer at
some point. What code obfuscation does is convert the code into a much more complex
form, such that it is functionally identical to the original, but more difficult for a human
to understand [19]. This makes reverse-engineering the code far too time consuming to
complete successfully, thus preventing the discovery of vulnerabilities in the program [45].
Code obfuscation is not only used in malware, but in legitimate applications as well [10,
45]. Typically code obfuscation is used to deter pirates from reverse-engineering programs
to circumvent copy protection, and there are commercial tools available for this purpose.
Rather than employ the previous home-grown methods of code obfuscation, botnets have
started to employ these commercial tools to prevent the reverse engineering of their code.
This makes research into this area a complex issue, as breaking the code obfuscation
techniques of botnets also breaks the products of legitimate companies, thereby assisting
the process of software piracy.
Virtualisation Detection
Virtualisation detection is the process a program uses to detect whether or not it is running
under a virtual machine, allowing it to change its execution path in order to hinder analysis.
Virtualisation has become a popular tool for studying malware, due to the ideal monitoring
and isolation capabilities it provides [6], making it not only a suitable environment for
malware analysis, but also for creating honeypots. As a result, a growing number of
botnets have been implementing virtualisation detection to hinder analysis under virtual
machines [3]. Typically when a botnet discovers it is running under virtualisation, it
halts its execution completely, in order to prevent low level and runtime analysis [14, 22].
Virtualisation detection is possible due to the fact that anomalies exist between virtual and
real machines, and that to make them indistinguishable is infeasible from a performance
and engineering standpoint [15].
Any of the differences between real and virtual machines could theoretically be used by
a botnet to detect whether a bot is running under a virtual machine or not [6]. One of the
many methods Conficker implements for example is known as the “Red Pill” technique,
which involves checking the memory location of a particular critical operating system
object [6, 14]. The memory addresses that this object is stored at differs significantly
depending on whether the operating system has been installed on a real or virtual machine.
As making virtual machines indistinguishable from real machines is infeasible [15], the only
available method is to disguise the virtual machines against the detection methods used.
While disguising virtual machines to block such detection methods is possible, the delay it
causes to researchers gaining a full understanding of the botnet is still worthwhile to bot
masters.
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Command Encryption using Secret Sharing Schemes
Command encryption using secret sharing schemes is designed to provide confidentiality for
botnet commands, something no current botnet achieves. Although many botnets encrypt
the botnet communications to keep the traffic secret in transit, it does not stop adversaries
capturing and learning the contents of the messages at the source and destination [46]. This
is a problem for bot masters, as these intercepted commands may allow an adversary to
discover a planned attack and successfully prevent it. Achieving command confidentiality
is possible for the bot master using a shared secret scheme, which involves splitting the
public key used by bots within the botnet into multiple parts, a certain number of which
are required to form the entire key [46, 50]. Under such a scheme, when the bot master
wishes for the command distributed across the botnet to be executed, the bots all share
the part of the key they possess, allowing the entire key to be obtained and the command
decrypted. Defeating such a scheme would require an adversary to be able to reconstruct
the secret, in order to learn of the attack ahead of time, or to attempt to remove enough key
parts to make reconstruction of the key impossible, both of which are extremely difficult
tasks.
Honeypot Awareness
Honeypot Awareness is a conceptual technique which aims to prevent honeypots, machines
specially designed to be infected, from joining the botnet by exploiting the differences be-
tween honeypots and regular machines. Since honeypots are typically run by researchers,
there are ethical and legal constraints that act upon these machines that bot masters can
exploit in order to avoid them [51]. While honeypots do their best to imitate legitimate
machines, the difference is that researchers cannot legally allow their machines to partici-
pate in botnet activities. If they did, they would in effect be intentionally damaging other
machines due to their deliberate participation in botnet activities.
Being unable to perform malicious activities provides bot masters with a discrepancy
they can exploit to prevent honeypots from joining the botnet, ensuring that only genuinely
vulnerable machines are able to join. Zou et al. [51] proposed a method of achieving this
by using sensors to ensure that newly infected machines correctly carry out malicious
instructions. These sensors are machines already under the bot masters control that are
included in a newly infected machine’s list of attack targets, allowing the bot master to
verify if these instructions are carried out correctly. This essentially imposes an initiation
ritual on joining the botnet, forcing machines to prove that they are willing to contribute
before they are allowed to join.
If the new machine passes this initiation process, it has been shown to not be a honey-
pot, and is sent the necessary information required to join the botnet control structure. By
preventing honeypots from joining the botnet, it prevents security researchers from being
able to analyse the botnet and its control structure. While there are no known counter-
measures for researchers against botnets employing such a technique [51], the technique
can be rendered ineffective if honeypots were to simply execute the malicious instruction.
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3.4 Preventing Loss of Botnet Control
Maintaining control of the botnet is possibly the most important concern for the bot
master, as the longer the bot master can retain control of the botnet the more they are
able to profit from it. This process of maintaining control is effectively how long the bot
master can prevent their adversaries from taking the botnet down, typically achieved by
shutting down, hijacking or disabling the command and control structure. This means that
usually it is the resilience of the command and control structure to such outside attacks
that determines how long the botnet lasts.
Features of techniques in this category:
• provide security mechanisms to hinder attempts to disable the botnet; and
• provide benefit even when technique is known and well understood.
This category contains further subcategories which describe the techniques in more
detail.
3.4.1 Preventing Takedown of Command and Control Structure
In the past botnets have relied on central control servers to which all bots connected
to [5, 20, 22, 47]. This provided adversaries with a central point of failure that they
could target, that if taken down crippled the botnets functionality, even though numerous
individual botnet infections remained [20, 21, 47]. The reason that this method was so
successful was that the command servers had their IP addresses hardcoded [1], making
botnets unable to recover from such an attack. Unsurprisingly, bot masters have developed
new command and control technologies, that move away from the hardcoded, centralised
methodologies of the past.
Features of techniques in this category:
• provide the botnet’s command distribution channel; and
• more resistant to takedown than simple central command and control servers.
Techniques in this category:
• Peer-to-Peer;
• Fast Flux;
• Domain Flux;
• Bulletproof Hosting; and
• Hierarchical Structure.
These techniques are described in more detail below.
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Peer-to-Peer
Peer-to-peer botnets remove the need for a centralised server by making every peer capable
of acting as a server, removing the central point of failure entirely [20]. Examples of peer-
to-peer botnets include Storm [20, 23], Waledac [4] and Conficker [14, 28, 44]. Storm’s peer-
to-peer system is based on the Overnet file sharing protocol, and works by searching the file
sharing network for files with particular names to obtain commands. This implementation
however was vulnerable to various methods of being disabled, including peer flooding and
command pollution, resulting in the botnet’s demise.
Waledac employs a tiered peer-to-peer approach, where to receive commands bots con-
tact another bot which acts as a proxy to contact more centralized command and control
servers on their behalf [4]. Employing this two-tier approach makes the botnet much
harder to take down, as it allows the bot master to easily change the command and control
backbone [29]. However this tiered approach has the downside of intentionally creating
man-in-the-middle scenarios as part of the communication protocol, which can be easily
abused [29].
Conficker takes a more traditional peer-to-peer approach, except that it does not rely
on lists of known peers to communicate with, but instead continuously scans for new
peers [14, 44]. This protects Conficker against the malicious peer flooding attacks used
against the Storm botnet, as Conficker will only contact these malicious peers once before
then searching for new ones. Such a technique however is quite noisy in that it relies
on generating a lot of traffic, making it vulnerable to techniques such as traffic filtering.
Conficker has managed to avoid traffic filtering however, due to the fact that it generates
random ports based on the IP address being contacted, which change on a weekly basis [14].
A well designed peer-to-peer network, such as the one used by Conficker, is impossible to
shutdown without removing almost every individual infection.
Fast Flux
Fast flux is the process of having a domain name report a different IP address with each
request, an extension of the load-balancing concept used between multiple web servers to
achieve high availability [4]. Each of these reported IP addresses corresponds to a different
bot within the botnet, which can be configured to either host malicious content itself or
simply act as a proxy to the “mothership”, a central server responsible for hosting the
content [4, 38]. This provides extremely high availability, as well as allowing the botnet
operators to obscure the true origins of their servers [38] and defeat IP blacklisting tech-
niques [44]. Similar to the IP blacklisting described in Section 3.2.1, this technique prevents
machines from communicating with the target IP address. In this case however, this is
achieved by blocking incoming communications to the IP address, rather than preventing
outgoing communications to the IP address.
The weakness of the fast flux approach is that everything relies on a single domain name,
and in the proxying scenario, a central hosting server as well. This means that shutting
either of these down will result in the fast flux network going down as well. Alternatively,
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given the difficulties of shutting down the domain at the register level [38], blacklisting the
domain name can be used to target this central point of failure [44].
Domain Flux
Domain flux is an extension of the fast flux concept, which instead of constantly changing
the servers that a domain resolves to, constantly changes the domain that resolves to the
server. In this way domain flux overcomes the limitations of fast flux, as it is able to
avoid domain blacklisting, domain takedown and server takedown, in addition to the IP
blacklisting provided by fast flux [44]. The disadvantage with domain flux is that in order
to retain control of the botnet new domains must continually be registered. For domain
flux to work, it requires that the domain generation algorithm be deterministic, so that
all machines generate the same domain to connect to. This poses a problem for botnet
operators, as they must ensure that they register the necessary domains to retain control
of the botnet before anyone else does. A lapse in domain registration can lead to somebody
else hijacking the botnet, as Stone-Gross et al. [43] were able to achieve against the Torpig
botnet.
This hijacking was only possible however because the Torpig bots blindly trusted the
servers it contacted, and the domains were connected to in a fixed order [43]. These design
flaws were rectified in the domain flux used by the Conficker botnet however, as it required
authentication of commands and connected to domains in a random order [14, 28, 40, 44].
As an added security measure, Conficker greatly increased the number of domains generated
each day by the domain flux algorithm compared to Torpig [14, 40], generating 50,000 new
domains each day with the later variants [14, 28, 44]. Since hijacking is not possible with
Conficker, the only attack against the domain flux implementation is to register all the
domains in order to starve the botnet of commands. However, continuously registering such
a large number of domains each day makes such an approach economically infeasible [43].
Bulletproof Hosting
Bulletproof hosting is identical to regular hosting except that the companies that provide
such a service have very lenient policies regarding content hosted on the server [4]. What
this means is that such providers are non-responsive to abuse requests, or even move the
hosted content to affiliated partners when pressure to take down the host rises [29]. As
such, it can be very difficult to get servers hosted in this way shut down [4]. There is an
increasing reliance of botnet operators on such services, which is best demonstrated by
the aftermath of the shut down of the McColo hosting service. McColo was a web hosting
service based in the USA that for a long time provided hosting for the majority of the
world’s spammers [24]. After immense pressure was applied, McColo’s upstream providers
pulled the plug on them, resulting in a drop in the volume of spam of between 40 and 75
percent for several weeks. Spam did not return to the levels present before the shutdown
for at least five months, showing a clear dependence of botnet operators on such bulletproof
hosting services.
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As law enforcement and security experts have moved to take these bulletproof hosting
providers offline, bot masters and other malware authors have begun to set up their own
bulletproof hosting services instead [13]. This is possible due to the fact that these malware
authors have been able to purchase blocks of IP address space from regulatory bodies, and
consequently set up their own servers and data centres to run on these IP addresses [13].
Cutting out the middle man in such operations makes it much easier for the bot master,
as they do not have to hide their activities from their hosting providers, nor respond to
any abuse complaints. Once allocated, getting the IP address space back can be a long
and arduous process, by which time botnet operators can simply move to a new setup [13].
Such practices are likely to become more common in the future, and little can be done
about it except to speed up the process with which the IP addresses are retrieved.
Hierarchical Structure
A hierarchical command and control structure is a takedown resistant structure that has
been proposed by researchers that botnets have yet to employ. This method fortifies the
command structure by splitting the botnet into numerous smaller botnets, each using a
unique communication channel [46, 50]. By using a hierarchical structure to connect these
smaller botnets, even if one third of the individual botnets are shut down, one third of
the botnets would still be reachable from any node. The intention of such a scheme is to
effectively build an “army” of botnets, with the number of individual botnets ranging well
into the tens of thousands, making shutting even one third of them down an infeasible
task. According to the authors of this scheme, the resilience of the command structure
means the only defence is a preventative one.
3.4.2 Preventing Botnet Takeover
While disabling botnets has previously been achieved by shutting down the command and
control servers, this is not always possible. An alternative means of disabling the botnet is
to effectively take it over, an approach that has been used on peer-to-peer botnets. This
can be achieved by making the command channel unusable to the bot master, therefore
making the bots unable to receive the bot master’s commands. Bot masters not only face
such risks from the security community, but also from other bot masters wishing to take
over their botnet. Botnets face the same territory wars as real life gangs, with some botnets
such as SpyEye explicitly containing functionality to disable other botnets [7]. For this
reason, to the bot master it is important that they protect the command channel of their
botnet against these external threats.
Features of techniques in this category:
• hinders attempts to take over the botnet command channel or the botnet’s resources.
Techniques in this category:
• Patching Infection Vector;
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• Digitally Signing Bot Master Commands;
• Proof of Work Schemes; and
• Reputation System.
These techniques to prevent botnet takeover are now described in more detail.
Patching Infection Vector
Patching the infection vector is a technique to maintain control of the computer once is has
been infected. While it is important to protect the infection from anti-malware software and
hide from detection using rootkits, it is also important to protect the system from being
taken over by other malware. For this reason, it is quite common in modern malware
to patch a vulnerability after successful exploitation [28]. This prevents other malware
from infecting the compromised system [28], thus preventing other malware from taking
over the machine and hijacking the botnet [44]. While this prevents other malware from
infecting the system, it also prevents the possibility of using the vulnerability to remotely
cleanse the machine of infection. Using the vulnerability to remotely cleanse the system
however would require the execution of code on machines without permission, making such
a method illegal in many countries [29].
Digitally Signing Bot Master Commands
Digitally signing bot master commands provides a method of authenticating the commands
received by bots in a botnet. Without such authentication, once a botnet’s communication
protocol is significantly understood, there is the risk that others will inject commands into
the botnet [29]. Such commands could have inoculating effects, or take the botnet down
completely. There are many botnets active, such as Waledac, that do not employ authen-
tication methods on bot master commands [4], making such command injection attacks
possible. By employing a method of authenticating commands, such as digitally signing
bot master commands using public key encryption, such attacks can be avoided. The
Conficker botnet employs this method, digitally signing commands with the bot master’s
4096-bit private key [44], and always verifying the commands it receives, making attacking
the botnet via this mechanism extremely hard, if not impossible [28]. Given the difficulty
of factoring keys of sufficient length, digitally signing commands is a simple yet effective
method of preventing command injection for a botnet, making the lack of such methods
in many botnets surprising.
Proof of Work Schemes
Proof of work schemes are the use of cryptographic puzzles when forming connections,
which are time consuming for a client to complete, but able to be quickly verified by
the server [21]. While no current botnets employ this mechanism, such a proof of work
scheme could be used to prevent flooding attacks, by making the amount of computational
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resources required to perform such an attack infeasible [21]. By implementing these crypto-
graphic puzzles as a requirement for joining the botnet, such a proof of work scheme would
prevent the peer flooding attacks that took peer-to-peer botnets such as Storm down [20].
While such proof-of-work schemes are not currently implemented in botnets, they are used
in numerous other security applications. The authors of this scheme offer no countermea-
sures to the implementation of such an approach [21], suggesting that the only method
would be the expensive option of employing more computing resources.
To determine the effects the use of such a technique would have on attempts to disable
peer-to-peer botnets, this technique was implemented in a simulated peer-to-peer botnet,
the details of which are described in Section 4.
Reputation System
While not currently implemented by any botnets, reputation systems are a method of estab-
lishing a trust metric in peer-to-peer networks. Most peer-to-peer botnets are vulnerable to
the possibility of malicious agents joining the botnet and disrupting communications, due
to the fact that they must allow new machines, which run on untrusted platforms, to join
the network [29]. By implementing a reputation system, such as the one proposed by Hund
et al. [21], the impact of such malicious peers can be minimized. Such a reputation sys-
tem works by having each peer maintain an independent list of credit points for the peers
it contacts, with more credit points implying more trust with the relevant peer. These
credit points are earned by actively participating in the botnet by correctly forwarding
command and update messages, and lost when this does not occur. When the reputation
score of a peer drops below a set threshold, that peer is ostracized from further commu-
nications, making it impossible for malicious peers to infiltrate and disrupt the network
without actually contributing to its survival first. This system has the added bonus of also
preventing honeypots from infiltrating the network, as legal and ethical constraints could
prevent them from participating in the network at all [51]. The authors of this scheme
provide no possible countermeasures to botnets implementing such an approach [21].
To determine the effects the use of such a technique would have on attempts to disable
peer-to-peer botnets, this technique was implemented in a simulated peer-to-peer botnet,
the details of which are described in Section 4.
3.4.3 Preventing Botnet Extinction
Unlike early viruses and worms, botnets are designed to persist and survive for long periods
of time. This is because once a botnet has been established, it will continue to generate
profits for the bot master without incurring any significant running costs. Due to the
continuous threats that the security community poses to botnets, the long term survival of
the botnet relies on the bot master’s ability to adapt the botnet to overcome new threats.
With no input from the bot master, the security community will eventually be able to
disable the botnet, causing the bot master to lose their source of income. Thus for a bot
master, it is important that they evolve their botnet over time to overcome the threats
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made to its existence.
Features of techniques in this category:
• relies directly on the actions of the bot master; and
• results in protecting the botnet against emerging threats to its existence.
Techniques in this category:
• Tracking Vulnerability Analysis; and
• Updating Botnet Code.
These two techniques are now described in more detail.
Tracking Vulnerability Analysis
Botnets and the techniques they employ are becoming increasingly resilient to known
attacks, due to the fact that the bot masters are actively tracking the vulnerability analysis
of their creations. Doing so allows bot masters to keep tabs on the solutions deployed to
counter their botnets, allowing them to fix their creation’s weaknesses [2]. While the fact
that bot masters have been doing this has been suspected for some time, the operators of
Koobface proved that they do so by taunting a security researcher directly by thanking him
for “the help in bug fixing, researches and documentation for our software”. This message
accompanied the transition by the Koobface bot masters to an improved command and
control architecture, soon after a weakness in the previous architecture had been discovered.
The operators of Koobface however are not the only ones demonstrating the use of
this security practice. Conficker’s authors have been tracking the news on Conficker and
finding solutions to evade countermeasures [28]. Earlier versions of Conficker generated
250 domains a day to contact [14, 40], and researchers responded by attempting to block
all of these domains [16]. However, when a new version was delivered from a single un-
blocked domain, it was clear that Conficker’s authors knew of this strategy. [16]. This
updated version of Conficker generated 50,000 domains each day [14, 28, 44], making con-
tinuously registering such a large number of domains each day economically infeasible [43].
Researchers scrambled to try and register as many domains as they could, but the domain
flux was in fact a red herring [16]. Conficker had misdirected researchers, it did not use
any of the domains it generated, and never intended to, but instead updated using its
peer-to-peer capabilities [16]. Conficker’s authors not only effectively tracked the progress
of researchers, but managed to use the extensive study of their botnet against researchers
to waste significant amounts of their time and resources. With the way in which botnet
research material is publicly available, there is little that can be done about bot masters
exploiting the information in this way.
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Updating Botnet Code
When bot masters realise that there is a vulnerability in their creation, either by tracking
the progress of researchers or having it actively exploited, the only solution is to update
their botnet. This makes having a robust update feature a crucial aspect for a botnet’s
success, as if the botnet is unable to update while under threat it will eventually be
taken down. When the Storm botnet was attacked by researchers, the command fetching
mechanism was flooded with fake, innocuous commands [20]. This therefore prevented the
bot master from sending update commands to the botnet, leading to its eventual demise.
Conficker’s update system, which allows the use of peer-to-peer or domain flux [14, 28], is
an example of a more robust update feature.
When implementing an update system however there is the risk that others will abuse
the functionality, to disable the botnet or install their own malware. Even though many
botnets could potentially be removed from systems by exploiting weak update systems,
downloading and running code on a remote computer without the owner’s permission is
illegal in many countries [29]. There is also the possibility of unintended and unpredictable
results from executing such measures, such as rendering the machine unusable [32]. If
infections resided on systems such as critical infrastructure or hospital systems, as was
the case with some Conficker infections [16], the potential side effects could be disastrous.
While using such invasive countermeasures has severe legal and ethical consequences, such
constraints do not apply to other malware authors. For this reason, the security of such
update systems is still a concern for bot masters.
3.5 Conclusion
There are numerous techniques at a bot master’s disposal to defend their creations against
external threats. Many of the techniques currently employed have no effective countermea-
sures, the use of which has effectively allowed numerous botnets to continue their malicious
operations. In this sense, the bot masters are currently leading the arms race, and unfor-
tunately it would seem that this lead is growing. On top of the many techniques botnets
currently employ, there are still several techniques bot masters have yet to employ, all of
which have no known countermeasures. Due to the fact that the odds are already tipped
in their favour, it is unlikely that any of these techniques will be seen until such a time that
the bot masters must employ them in order to continue their operations. In preparation
for this event however, the next section analyses two of these techniques in more detail.
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As the taxonomy demonstrates, there are numerous techniques that bot masters currently
use to defend their creations, but there are still many more that bot masters have yet to
take advantage of. If bot masters were to implement these new techniques, the resilience
introduced by these techniques could significantly impact attempts to disable the botnet
by the security community. In order to investigate and quantify the threat posed by the
use of these new techniques, this experiment aims to demonstrate the effects that the
implementation of reputation systems and proof of work schemes on peer-to-peer botnets
would have on their resilience to attack. This will be achieved by simulating a peer-to-
peer botnet with and without the use of these techniques, and measuring the effect these
techniques have on attempts to disable the botnet.
4.1 Technique Selection Rationale
In order to determine the future prospects of winning this arms race, only techniques that
bot masters have yet to employ can be examined. This is because it is the success of
these future techniques that will determine if botnets can be disabled and the botnet arms
race won. The taxonomy provides five such techniques that bot masters have yet to em-
ploy, honeypot awareness, command encryption using secret sharing schemes, hierarchical
structures, proof of work schemes and reputation systems.
While avoiding honeypots using honeypot awareness is a desirable option for bot mas-
ters, effectively countering it simply requires the operator of the honeypot to ignore or
not be affected by the ethical and legal constraints employed on other honeypot operators.
Although employing a secret sharing scheme to encrypt commands is a attractive idea for
bot masters, securely implementing such a technique, particularly key distribution, over a
botnet population is an enormous increase in complexity, and one that is not essential to
the continued operation of their botnets. Even though the redundancy provided by a hier-
archical structure would be a significant benefit to bot masters, once formed the structure
prohibits the botnet from expanding, affecting not only bot master profits but the botnet’s
long term viability. While these techniques all provide features or functionality desirable
to bot masters, they suffer from flaws that make their implementation less desirable than
other available techniques. This does not mean however that these techniques should not
be analysed, as implemented correctly they still pose significant hurdles to the security
community.
Reputation systems and proof of work schemes, like the other conceptual techniques,
provide features that are desirable to bot masters. Both techniques provide a method of
preventing the takeover or attack of peer-to-peer botnets, which given the success of such
methods on the Storm botnet, is an important security concern for bot masters. Unlike
the other conceptual techniques however, these techniques do not possess the severe limi-
tations or implementation difficulties of the other techniques, making them the most likely
choice that bot masters will implement, which in turn makes them excellent candidates
for analysis. While the use of such techniques in botnets has been previously described,
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no research has been performed into the effect they would have on botnets if they were
actually implemented.
4.2 Technical Background
In order to run experiments to analyse the effect reputation systems and proof of work
schemes will have on a peer-to-peer botnet, a botnet to run these experiments on is required.
Aside from the technical requirements involved in achieving this, creating a real botnet for
such a purpose would not only be unethical but most likely illegal. For these reasons it
was decided that a simulated botnet would be created and used instead. This section
documents the protocols and functionality of that this simulated botnet will employ, as
well as how attempts to disable the botnet will be made.
4.2.1 Peer-to-Peer Protocol
This botnet features a peer-to-peer command and control structure, based on the ideal
botnet suggested by Holz et al. [21], the paper that introduced the concept of using a
reputation system and proof of work scheme in a peer-to-peer botnet. In this peer-to-peer
protocol, bots connect directly to each other in order to form a distribution network for
bot master commands. When a peer receives a new command, it forwards the command
to the peers it is connected to, which in turn forward the command to the peers they are
connected to and so on, a process which continues until all bots have seen the command.
An example of this process is seen in Figure 2. To improve network performance and lower
the amount of bandwidth used by each machine, each peer only forwards commands that
it has not yet seen. This distribution network allows the bot master to send commands to
the entire botnet by simply selecting one or more peers at random and sending them the
command directly. Since each of these commands are cryptographically signed by the bot
master and verified by each machine before forwarding, it is impossible for someone other
than the bot master to inject commands into the botnet.
Each peer in the botnet keeps track of the other peers that it knows about, and has
a default list of these peers when it is first infected. This peer list is used to establish
connections to other peers in order to join the botnet. When a machine infected by the
botnet turns on, it randomly selects a peer from its peer list to try and connect to. In
the event that this peer is unavailable, it is removed from the list and another peer is
tried. A peer can be unavailable because it is not currently online, or because the peer
has reached its connection limit, and therefore is not allowed to accept new connections.
This connection limit is imposed to avoid congestion on popular peers, and stop the botnet
structure building around key peers. In the event that a peer has failed connecting to every
peer in its peer list, and consequently has an empty peer list, a backup service is used to
retrieve a new list of peers. For the purposes of this experiment, this service simply sends
a list of random new peers, and is considered immune to attack or abuse.
Upon successfully establishing a connection to another peer, the two peers exchange
peer lists and the connection process is repeated until a desired number of connections have
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Figure 2: Typical command distribution process
35
4 Approach
been formed. When exchanging peer lists, only a fragment of the peer list is exchanged.
This prevents an attacker from learning the full contents of a peer’s peer list, stopping
techniques such as those used to crawl the Storm botnet from being used [21]. Once
connections have been established, they remain connected until one of the machines goes
offline. For this reason the connections formed by peers change only as the result of bots
coming online and offline. While bots coming online and going offline is typically caused by
the machines running the bots turning on and off, it can also be caused by new machines
being infected and infected machines being disinfected. The behaviour of an individual
bot following this peer-to-peer protocol is shown in Figure 3.
Due to the globally distributed nature of a botnet, although the number of machines
infected by the botnet may remain constant, the number of machines online at any one time
varies greatly. For example, while the Torpig botnet had approximately 180,000 machines
under its control, it only had between approximately 35,000 and 70,000 online at any one
time [43]. The actual amount of peers online is a function of the current time, with a
maximum at 17:00 UTC and a minimum at 05:00 UTC [43]. Although Torpig is not a
peer-to-peer botnet, the detailed population figures available makes it a suitable template
for the population of this simulated botnet.
4.2.2 Attacks on Peer-to-Peer Botnets
The typical method to disable botnets is to disrupt the command distribution channel in
order to prevent the bots within the botnet from receiving commands, thereby rendering
the botnet useless. Mitigation methods against peer-to-peer botnet operate in the same
fashion, by attempting to prevent the distribution of bot master commands, the difference
being that this command distribution channel is highly distributed. In order to disable the
command channel of a peer-to-peer botnet, the connections between peers must be com-
promised to prevent commands from spreading throughout the network. Unlike centralised
command channels that can be shut down, stopping all bots from receiving commands, it is
almost impossible to prevent every peer in a peer-to-peer botnet from receiving commands.
In order to achieve this, it would require every connection within the botnet to be com-
promised, including those made by the bot master when injecting commands. Instead of
compromising every connection, the goal is to compromise as many as possible, to prevent
the majority of the bots from receiving commands.
In the past, against botnets such as Storm, this has been achieved by using what is
known as the sybil attack [20]. Peer-to-peer networks suffer from a flaw of having no way
in which peers can verify the identity of other peers, meaning that they must blindly trust
them and the information they send in order for the network to function. To achieve this
identity verification would require a central point of authority, introducing the central point
of failure that peer-to-peer networks attempt to avoid. The sybil attack takes advantage
of this by introducing a large quantity of fake peers, known as sybils, onto the network,
which appear to operate independently but are in fact all controlled by the one entity. By
controlling multiple peers on the network, an attacker is able to monitor the traffic between
peers, and manipulate it to disrupt communications.
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Figure 3: Bot Peer-to-Peer Behaviour
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Figure 4: Sybils affecting command distribution process
Disabling this peer-to-peer botnet requires that peers do not receive bot master com-
mands, and the sybil attack can be used to achieve this. Sybil peers will act just like regular
peers, except that they will not forward nor execute bot master commands. Thus when
the bot master sends a command, the sybils will not forward these commands, preventing
the command from propagating throughout the network. The problem with this approach
however is that peers do not just connect to one other peer, they connect to multiple peers,
meaning that to prevent a bot from receiving a command, all the peers that it connects to
need to be sybils. Given the size of current botnets, such an approach require an enormous
amount of resources.
Instead of attempting to compromise every connection of every peer in the botnet, the
goal is to position the sybils in the network such that the network is split into numerous
subgroups. These subgroups are collections of bots that only know about and connect
to each other, and are isolated from the rest of the network by sybils. This means that
while a command can spread successfully through a subgroup, it cannot spread from one
subgroup to the rest of the botnet, as doing so would require the sybils to forward the
command. An example of sybils affecting the command distribution process in this way
can be seen in Figure 4. Using this method, the percentage of bots within the botnet that
receive commands can effectively be minimised, crippling the botnet’s capabilities.
38
4 Approach
Figure 5: Sybil Peer-to-Peer Behaviour
To achieve this subgrouping of the botnet, it requires that the sybil nodes attempt to
control the way in which the bots connect to each other. Two factors crucial to this are
increasing the chances that a reconnecting peer will connect to sybils instead of legitimate
peers, and limiting the number of connections made by this peer to legitimate peers. Since
the peers a reconnecting bot connects to are chosen from the peer list, it is in the best
interests of the sybil nodes to place as many sybils in each peer’s peer list as possible.
This can be achieved by ensuring that all the peers sybils give during the peer exchange
process are other sybils, increasing the chances that a peer will select a sybil to connect
to from their peer list. Once a sybil has been connected to by a legitimate machine, the
more connections other sybils can make to it, the less connections are available to connect
to legitimate peers. For this reason, it is important to form as many connections to the
machine as possible, in order to isolate it from as much of the botnet as possible. Figure 5
shows the behaviour of a sybil in the peer-to-peer network compared to a legitimate peer
as shown in Figure 3.
Achieving this subgrouping of the botnet however can take a considerable amount of
time. The connections between bots within the botnet are dynamic, changing as machines
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within the botnet turn on and off. Given that most machines are only online for limited
periods of time each day, it could take multiple days of the machine coming online and
going offline before it is effectively isolated into a subgroup. In order to speed up this
process, more resources are required, so that more connections can be made, and more
bots within the botnet manipulated. Unfortunately, more resources requires more cost,
and as such there are limited resources available to attempt to take down such botnets.
This factor will be represented within the experiment by limiting the number and rate of
the connections that can be formed by the perpetrator of the Sybil attack.
4.2.3 Reputation Systems
In order to combat the possibility of Sybil attacks, Holz et al. [21] suggested the use of
a reputation system in peer-to-peer botnets. Reputation systems work by establishing a
trust metric between peers, allowing peers within the botnet to prioritize forming connec-
tions with peers that it trusts and avoid connections with those that it does not. In this
reputation system, each peer within the botnet maintains its own list of the peers that it
has seen and the number of credit points that peer has earned. This list, known as the
reputation list, is kept in addition to the regular peer list required for the peer-to-peer
protocol, and unlike the regular peer list, is never shared between peers. Since this list is
never shared, the reputations peers earn is limited only to the peer that it was earned with.
While this makes the implementation of this reputation system simple, it also prevents the
possibility of attacks on protocol flaws to fraudulently earn reputation.
Credit points are earned by correctly forwarding bot master commands, and lost by
not forwarding commands. Each of the commands a bot master sends has a time frame
associated with it, which signals the period of time in which this command is valid. When
the time frame expires, the credit points of any peers which a command was received from
are increased, and any peers a command was not received from are lowered. In addition
to providing a mechanism on which to base the distribution of credit points, the use of
command time frames also prevents the possibility of replay attacks. Due to the way in
which these credit points are earned, they not only represent how trustworthy a peer is,
but also provide an indication of their availability. For this reason, unlike the regular peer
list, peers are only removed from the reputation list when their credit points fall below a
threshold value, not if they are temporarily unavailable.
This reputation list is used in conjunction with the regular peer list as a source of
peers when reconnecting to the botnet. Unlike the regular peer list, selecting a peer from
the reputation list is not done randomly, but instead the peers are connected to based on
the credit points they have earned. The peer with the highest amount of credit points is
attempted first, followed by the second highest, and so on until sufficient connections have
been established. Since the credit points represent availability as well as how trustworthy
a peer is, following this process allows the most suitable peers to be connected to. The
differences between the use of the regular peer list and the reputation peer list are shown
in Table 1.
In order for sybils to control the way in which the bots connect to each other, using this
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Regular List Reputation List
Peers added connection or peer exchange successful connection
Peers removed connection to peer fails peer credits fall below threshold
Peers selected randomly in order, highest credits first
Peers credited never command received within command
time frame
Credits lost never no command received before the time
frame expires
Table 1: Comparison of regular peer list and reputation peer list
reputation system requires that the reputation list be infiltrated as well as the regular peer
list. Without rising to the top of the reputation list, bots will continue making connections
to the same bots, preventing the sybils from isolating the bots into subgroups. To rise
to the top of the reputation list however requires the sybils to forward commands, and
therefore contribute to the structure and operation of the botnet. Participating in such
activities raises ethical and legal issues, which will prevent some wishing to take down such
botnets from performing such actions. This will be reflected in the experiment by having
sybil attacks on the reputation system take place without the sybils participating in the
distribution of commands.
4.2.4 Proof of Work
As previously discussed, proof of work schemes are the use of cryptographic puzzles that are
time consuming for a client to solve, but are easily verifiable by the server. These proof of
work puzzles can be used in order to validate the intentions of a machine wishing to connect
to a botnet. In this botnet, these proof of work puzzles are used in the connection process
between peers, and take place during the initial connection stage, before the exchange of
peer lists. The bot accepting the connection functions as the server, and generates the
puzzle for the client to solve. When the client successfully solves the puzzle, the solution is
sent to complete the connection, and the peer lists are then exchanged. In the event that
the machine solving the puzzle goes offline during the process, the machine waiting for the
solution simply drops the connection. While it is possible there would be machines online
for such short periods of time that they are unable to solve the proof of work tasks, they
would be of little use to the botnet, and as such denying them access to the botnet would
have little consequence.
While the implementation of the proof of work scheme has little effect on legitimate
peers, other than slowing the rate at which they form connections, it has significant impacts
on attempting to perform a sybil attack on the botnet. Requiring a proof of work task on
every connection formed significantly reduces the rate at which sybils can form connections,
as typically these huge numbers of fake peers are simulated on single physical machine.
By significantly slowing the rate at which the sybils can form connections, it significantly
slows the rate at which the sybils can isolate the botnet into subgroups, possibly even to
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the point where other bots communicating normally is enough to counteract the effect of
the sybils on the botnet.
Holz et al. [21] suggest five minutes as a possible proof of work solution time for such
a botnet, and this will be assumed to be the average time it takes bots to solve the
puzzle. This effectively means that each bot within the botnet will be able to initiate and
successfully form one connection with another bot every five minutes. As for the sybil
nodes, the number of tasks they will be able to solve within this five minute period will be
varied, to allow the impact of limiting the rate of connections to be seen.
4.3 Problem Definition
The limiting factor on the ability of the security community to disable peer-to-peer botnets
is the time and resources required to perform the attacks to achieve this. As the time taken
to perform the attack on the botnet increases, so too do the chances of the bot master
reacting to counter the attack. Decreasing the time that the attack takes requires an
increase in the resources used to perform the attack, increasing the costs of performing the
attack. Significantly increasing the resources required to perform the attack in a successful
time frame leads to the possibility of making such attacks financially infeasible. As such
it is in the best interests of the bot master to increase the time and resources required to
successfully attack their botnets as much as possible. This experiment aims to demonstrate
the effect that the use of reputation systems and proof of work schemes will have on the
time and resources required to successfully disable a peer-to-peer botnet, and therefore
show that the lead that bot masters hold in the arms race is increasing.
4.4 Method
To compare the effects the use of reputation systems and proof of work schemes have on
a peer-to-peer botnet, a method of simulating a peer-to-peer botnet was required. Such
tools were not available, so this platform was created, as described in Section 5. In order
to measure the result of using the reputation system and proof of work schemes, four
separate botnets were simulated. The first was the control botnet, a botnet using only
a peer-to-peer structure and no additional techniques. The remaining three botnets were
created by expanding this control botnet with a reputation system, a proof of work scheme,
and a combination of the two. This ensured that the only variation between the botnet
experiments was the technologies that the botnet employed.
Each botnet was simulated without the presence of an attacker for three simulation
days, allowing the peer-to-peer aspect of the botnet to stabilise and accurately represent
an established botnet that the security community wishes to disable. Even though less
than an hour of simulation time was required for the botnet to operate at full capacity,
this length of time was set to allow the peer lists of the bots to stabilize. At this point
the sybil nodes were switched on and began to attempt to disable the botnet. In order to
measure the effect the sybils had on the botnet, multiple bot master commands were sent
from randomly chosen nodes at regular intervals, and the amount of nodes these commands
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reached counted. Since to disable the botnet the sybil nodes would not forward commands,
this gave an accurate representation of the effect the sybil nodes were having on the botnet.
The simulation would then continue until less than 10% of the botnet received the bot
master’s commands. At this point the botnet was deemed to be effectively disabled, and
the process repeated multiple times to minimise the effect of the randomization present
in the botnet protocol. This process was then repeated for each of the variations in the
variables of this experiment, with the same random seeds to ensure the botnet behaved
in the same manner. The variation of these parametres is explained in more depth in
Section 4.5.1. In the event the parameters of the simulation meant that this target would
never be reached, a limit of a 24 hours of simulation time was given to the attempt at
disabling the botnet, after which point the attempt was deemed unsuccessful. This time
limit allowed the amount of resources required to disable the botnet within 24 hours to be
determined.
The major factor in this experiment that was varied was the techniques that the botnet
employed, in order to demonstrate the effect the use of these techniques had on attempts
to disable the botnet. To determine the amount of resources required to disable the botnet
within 24 hours, the amount of resources available to the sybils was also varied. These sybil
resources were set to various percentages of the botnet’s total resources, and consisted of
the maximum number of connections able to be formed per minute, and the number of proof
of work tasks able to be solved in the average solution time. The population of the botnet
was also varied, in order to determine any relationship between the amount of resources
required and the botnet size. Due to the time involved in running the experiments, these
populations were kept small when possible.
Apart from the variation in the techniques used by the botnet, the amount of resources
available to the sybils, and the botnet population, all other parameters were kept constant.
These parameters are explained in more depth in Section 4.5
In this simulation, it was assumed that the botnet was secure against protocol and im-
plementation based attacks, and that only its peer-to-peer nature could be exploited. This
ruled out possibilities such as forging or modifying bot master commands and exploiting
weaknesses in the proof of work puzzles. Defeating these mechanisms would likely be the
result of implementation errors rather than protocol errors. In addition, it was assumed
that the bot master does not take any action to prevent the pending attack during the 24
hour period, and that an attempt at disabling the botnet was deemed a failure if the target
command penetration was not reached in this time. The last major assumption was that
communications between peers in the botnet was considered instantaneous, and the only
action that took time to complete was the solving of a proof of work puzzle. Although a
factor such as message latency would have an effect on a real botnet, its impact was far
too insignificant to be modeled in this experiment.
4.5 Experimental Parameters
Table 2 outlines all of the parameters that were modifiable in the simulation, and their
default values where applicable. As can be seen, the parameters to be varied throughout
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Parameter Default Description
Botnet Size Varies Number of bots in the botnet
Trust Metric Varies Additional techniques applied on top of basic protocol
Connection Limit 50 Maximum number of connections a bot can make
Desired Connections 20 Bot attempts connections until this many are made
Exchange Size 8 Number of peers exchanged upon successful connection
Initial Peers 16 Number of peers a newly infected machine knows
Permanent Percentage 1% Percentage of bots permanently online
Reinfection Rate 3%/day Percentage of bots that are reinfected
Solution Time 5 min Average time taken by a bot to solve proof of work task
Injection Count 5 Number of bots a bot master command is directly sent to
Command Frequency 20 min Frequency with which bot master sends commands
Reputation Cutoff -20 Value at which a bot is removed from the reputation list
Sybil Ratio 1:10 Ratio of sybils to bots
Sybil Bandwidth Varies Bandwidth available to sybils for forming connections
Sybil Solution Count Varies Number of tasks sybils can solve in average solution time
Sybil Forwarding Off Sybil forwarding rule when reputation system is used
Target Penetration 10% Goal botnet command penetration
Table 2: Simulation Parameters
the course of the experiments were the botnet size, the use of the defensive techniques,
and the amount of resources available to the sybils. None of the other parameters were
changed throughout the experiments, unless explicitly specified in the results.
4.5.1 Variable Parameters
While values of the population and the techniques to use could easily be chosen, determin-
ing values for the amount of resources available to the sybils was slightly more difficult.
There was no information available on the sort of resources used in past sybil attacks, mak-
ing the estimation of these values in terms actual values extremely difficult. Information
about the average resources of a bot were also scarce, and even then depending on the
machines infected this value could vary greatly. However, since the average proof of work
time was set in this experiment, the average amount of computational resources for the
botnet was known. This allowed the sybil computational resources to be measured relative
to computational resources of individual bots, or in other words, the number of proof of
work tasks the sybils could solve in the average bot solution time.
Although this allowed the formation of a measurement for sybil computational re-
sources, a method of measuring the sybil bandwidth resources was also required. Since
the sybil computational resources were being expressed in comparison to the average bot
computational resources, the logical option was then to form a similar relationship for
measuring the bandwidth resources. This however required that the average bandwidth
available to a bot was known, which unfortunately was not the case.
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Research performed by Grizzard et al. [18] analysed the amount of network traffic gen-
erated by a peer-to-peer botnet infection, allowing the amount of bandwidth it consumed
to be seen. The resources consumed were expressed in the number of unique IP addresses
contacted, which accurately reflected the sybil bandwidth resources as the sybils were sim-
ply concerned with connecting to as many bots as possible. While figures of approximately
120 connections per minute were able to be extracted from the results of Grizzard et al. [18],
there were several problems with the method in which these were obtained.
The network capture from which these figures were extracted contained not only the
infection traffic, but the normal traffic from 10 other uninfected hosts. While this inflates
the figure for the number of connections made, the data recorded prior to the infection
demonstrates that the impact of the uninfected hosts on the results was quite minimal.
The major implication however was that the infection resides on an internet connection
capable of servicing 11 machines at once, meaning that the bandwidth available in this case
was likely to be higher than normal. In the event that such an environment was typical
for a botnet infection however, the other machines on the network would also probably
be infected, meaning that these machines would be sharing this high speed connection.
For these reasons, a conservative estimate of a bot on average being capable of forming 30
connections per minute was chosen, and the bandwidth resources of the sybils expressed
as having bandwidth equivalent to a certain number of bots.
4.5.2 Constant Parameters
Throughout the course of the simulations, there were numerous variables that were kept
constant, as can be seen in Table 2. The majority of these were concerned with the
connection parameters of the peer-to-peer protocol and the botnet population statistics,
while there were a few relating directly to the sybils and the use of the trust metrics. These
parameters were all kept constant throughout the experiments as there was insufficient time
available for observing the effects they have on the botnet’s command penetration.
Peer-to-Peer Parameters
The connection parameters for the botnet included the maximum number of connections
made by a bot, the desired number of connections, the size of the list in the peer exchange
and the number of peers a bot knows when it is first infected. Due to the fact that this was
a hypothetical protocol, based on the work done in a paper by Holz et al. [21], no suitable
values for these parameters existed. Although the authors of the paper were contacted, they
were unable to provide any such values with confidence. For this reason, a small amount
of informal experimentation was done with these parameters, to determine a suitable set
of values for a variety of botnet sizes, both large and small. The only constraint was that
the parameters always allowed 100% command penetration for the botnet, and the default
values listed in Table 2 show the results of this minor experiment.
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Population Parameters
As previously mentioned in Section 4.2, the population statistics came from a paper by
Stone-Gross et al. [43], which documented their findings after hijacking the Torpig botnet.
In terms of configurable parameters, the value that came from this paper was the rate
at which machines were reinfected. Throughout the 10 days that Stone-Gross et al. [43]
had control of the Torpig botnet, they recorded the attempts made by the bots to contact
the command and control server. They observed that while machines were cleansed and
never seen again, other machines were infected to take their place, which resulted in the
population staying constant. The reinfection rate symbolised this process of cleansing and
infecting in the experiments, by determining the rate at which bots were cleansed from
the network and consequently reinfected. When bots were reinfected they behaved as
completely new machines, and were seen by other bots as new machines. This allowed
the behaviour of bots permanently leaving and joining the botnet to be simulated, while
keeping the botnet population constant.
The other parameter that directly affected the population was the percentage of ma-
chines that were permanently online. These machines were set to be permanently online,
while the rest of the machines were randomly assigned times to turn on and off, such that
the botnet population followed the results found by Stone-Gross et al. [43]. Since con-
nections in the peer-to-peer protocol are held until the machine turns off, this meant that
machines that were permanently online would never initiate the closing of connections.
This meant that if multiple such machines were to connect to each other, they would
never disconnect, essentially form a command distribution backbone in the peer-to-peer
network. Such a backbone would have a significant impact on the command penetration of
the botnet, and was therefore an important consideration. No information on the average
percentage of permanently online machines in a botnet was able to be found, so the value
was assumed to be 1%. The effects of this assumption were explored in more detail in
Section 6.3.
Technique Parameters
The reputation system and the proof of work scheme required a few parameters for the
techniques to correctly function. The first was the average solution time for the proof of
work tasks. This value was set to 5 minutes, as this was the time suggested by the paper
in which it was described [21]. In order to determine the effect this proof of work solution
time had on the botnet’s command penetration, a set of experiments were performed in
which this value was varied. The results of these experiments can be seen in Section 6.4
While this was the only parameter required for the proof of work scheme, the reputation
system relied on how often commands were sent by the bot master, the value at which peers
were removed from the reputation list, and how the commands were injected onto the
botnet. There was no information available for what values these parameters should hold,
so estimations of accurate values had to be made. The rate at which the bot master sent
commands was set to be quite frequent, in order to emphasize the impact the reputation
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system had on the botnet. This is because the more often commands are sent, the more
often peers that are not participating are removed from the reputation list. The value at
which peers were removed from the reputation list was set to be quite low, so that peers
had a preference in connecting to peers that were online at similar times to themselves.
Lastly, when commands were sent by the bot master, they were injected simultaneously
from five different bots, in order to maximize the potential command penetration.
Sybil Parameters
The last set of parameters relate directly to the operations of the sybils. The sybil ratio was
set to 1:10, as this was found to be the optimal ratio of sybils to peers in the experiments
performed by Davis et al. [9]. Although the nature of their experiment differs slightly
to the one described here, this was the best estimate for this value that was available.
While initially the effect of sybils forwarding against not forwarding was to be determined,
preliminary results showed that sybils did not need to forward commands to be successful,
and command forwarding was therefore set permanently to off. The final parameter was the
target command penetration that the sybils were aiming to reduce the botnet’s command
penetration to. This parameter was set to 10%, as this was deemed to be the point at
which the botnet had been successfully disabled.
4.6 Summary
Looking at the techniques bot masters were likely to implement in the near future high-
lighted the reputation system and proof of work scheme as the most likely candidates.
While both of these techniques employed different methods, their goal is the same; to pre-
vent the sybil attack on peer-to-peer botnets. The reputation system rates peers according
to their participation, and prevents the sybil attack by excluding the machines that do not
participate. The proof of work scheme prevents the sybil attack by adding a proof of work
puzzle to the connection process, in order to significantly increase the resources required to
stage such an attack. Determining just how effective these techniques are however required
the formation of a set of experiments.
A set of experiments were designed to evaluate how the use of these techniques affected
the resources required to disable a peer-to-peer botnet. This process was simulate the
botnet and allow it to stabilize, before then performing a sybil attack with various amounts
of sybil resources. These sybil attacks ran for 24 hours of simulation time, at which point
the command penetration of the botnet was recorded. If this value was below 10%, the
botnet was deemed to be disabled.
While there were numerous parameters to these experiments that were available, the
vast majority of these were kept constant. Between experiments only the botnet size,
the techniques used by the botnet, and the amount of sybil resources were varied, unless
otherwise stated. The other parameters, which controlled aspects such as the botnet peer-
to-peer protocol and the frequency of bot master commands, were kept constant to allow
consistency between the results. While the effect of some of these parameters were explored
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in more detail, such as the proof of work solution time, insufficient time was available to
examine them all.
Performing these experiments however required the creation of a simulation framework
on which to run them. The design and implementation of this framework is discussed in
detail in the next section.
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In order to compare the effects that the use of reputation systems and proof of work
schemes would have on the time and resources required to attack a peer-to-peer botnet, a
way in which to actually simulate such attacks was required. Available botnet simulation
tools placed a strong emphasis on simulating the attacks produced by botnets, rather than
attacks on the botnet, which was required for this experiment. While peer-to-peer network
simulation tools could have been used in this experiment, a significant amount of time
would have been required to understand the tool and modify it accordingly.
Utilising one of the many available agent-based modeling tools was also an option,
and much like the botnet and network simulation tools, the use of these tools would have
involved a steep learning curve. The way in which these tools are constructed places the
focus on agents reacting with the environment, which includes the other agents, rather
than the other agents directly. For a network such as a botnet, where any node should
be capable of communicating with any other node at any point in time, replicating this
in an agent-based modeling tool would have required additional complexity that would
have defeated the purpose of using such a tool. In addition, other complex behaviour,
such as the collaboration and shared resources between sybils, would have been difficult to
implement in these tools. As a result, the decision was made to build a botnet simulation
framework from scratch, so that complete control over the simulation could be enabled.
5.1 Simulation Design
As with many programming projects, there was a trade-off to be made with regards to the
implementation of the botnet. At one end of the spectrum is the low-level implementation,
allowing an efficient and precise simulation, at the expensive of significant implementation
time. The other end of the spectrum is the high-level scripting language implementation,
allowing quick prototyping and rapid development, at the expense of simulation speed. Due
to the proof-of-concept nature of this simulation framework, the high-level implementation
was chosen, such that the framework could be quickly produced. The Ruby programming
language was chosen for this purpose.
The next stage was to design the actual simulation aspect of the botnet. For this
experiment, the important factors are the interactions and connections formed between
bots, and the interactions and connections formed between bots and sybils. These are the
only factors that determine how a bot master command propagates through the network,
and as a result are the only aspects required to effectively simulate the botnet and the
attack upon it. In terms of the OSI model or the TCP/IP model, this meant that only the
application layer affected the experiment, and as a result, was the only layer that needed
to be simulated.
Since the way in which the packets passed between bots was arbitrary, it meant that bots
could be modeled as simple objects. These objects would then recreate a bot’s behaviour
by passing these packets to other bot objects and react accordingly as a result of receiving
these packets. This meant that the simulation would effectively be event driven, as all
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behaviour would occur as the result of bots passing messages to other bots. Rather than
pass the packets to other bots directly, it was decided that a queue would be used store
the packets sent between bots. This way, the simulation could be run by removing the
first packet from the queue, passing it to the destination bot, and then adding any packets
sent as a result to the end of the queue, and continuing this process until the queue was
empty. By using a queue rather than passing packets between bots directly, it allows each
bot a chance to act, and prevents the simulation’s execution from becoming stuck on a
particular bot.
Since a botnet’s population changes according to the time of day, this simulation was
still missing a temporal aspect to allow such behaviour. Only one aspect of the botnet to
be simulated takes a known period of time, and this is the average solution time to the
proof of work task, which is five minutes. For this reason, the simulation of the botnet was
split into distinct steps, each of which represents five minutes of simulation time. Each step
consisted of turning bots on or off, according to the online times distributed to each bot,
queuing packets as a result of these actions, then emptying the packet queue. Once the
packet queue was empty, this step was completed, and the next step began. When proof
of work is used, this means that in one step a bot attempts to form a connection, and in
the following step sends the proof of work solution to successfully complete the connection
establishment process. When proof of work is not used however, numerous connections
can be made by each bot in each step, meaning that breaking the simulation into steps
only determines when machines turn on or off.
5.2 Implementation Design
Once the basics of the simulation had been decided upon, the next step was to design
the actual implementation of the simulation. The results of this process can be seen in
Figure 6. In order to describe the design in more depth, this section describes the classes
as they are used during the execution of a simulation.
In this design, the Simulation class serves as the entry point of the program, responsi-
ble for setting the parameters of the simulation and maintaining its subsequent execution.
There are numerous parameters that the Simulation class is responsible for setting, in-
cluding the size of the botnet, the number of sybil peers, and the technologies being used.
Each of these parameters are declared as global constants, due to the fact they are required
at various different places during execution. The Simulation class is also responsible for
recording the results, creating a file with the specified name and recording the state of the
simulation at defined intervals.
The next step is to instantiate the Botnet class, which is responsible for controlling
the botnet as a whole, which includes maintaining the bots within the botnet, the actions
of the sybils, the packets sent between bots and keeping track of time within the botnet.
An instance of the PacketQueue class is responsible for distributing all the packets sent
between bots, which are all instances of the Packet class. A link to this PacketQueue
instance is passed to each bot as it is created.
Bots within the botnet are either Legitimate or Sybil objects, both of which inherit from
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Figure 6: UML Diagram for botnet simulation
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the Bot class. While the Bot class implements the majority of the core botnet functionality,
the Legitimate and Sybil classes contain the slight variations to this functionality required
to implement the correct behaviour of each of these peer types. While the legitimate peers
act independently, the sybil peers are coordinated by the SybilController class. This class
coordinates the attempts of the sybils by maintaining the shared peer list, providing the
details of other sybils to swap during peer exchange and information on which Legitimate
peers to attempt to connect to. In addition to this, the SybilController also keeps track
of the resources used by the sybils, making it possible to limit the amount of resources
available as desired.
Once all the necessary elements have been instantiated by the Botnet class, the sim-
ulation is able to begin. The Simulation class calls the Step function within the Botnet
class, which increments the botnet time and in turn calls the Step function on each Bot
object in the botnet. Within the Bot object, the Step function is responsible for checking
whether the bot should be online or offline, if any proof of work tasks have been solved,
and whether any new connections need to be formed. The end result of calling the Step
function of each Bot object is that each bot is allowed a chance to act, which results in
Packet objects being added to the PacketQueue.
The first Packet object from the PacketQueue object is then removed and passed to the
destination Bot object. When the bot receives this packet, it then performs the necessary
response to receiving the packet, such as queuing a new accept connection or reject con-
nection packet. The process of popping packets off the queue, passing them to the target
bot and queuing any new packets continues until no packets are left in the queue. Once
the queue is empty, it signifies that this step of the simulation has ended, which accounts
for five minutes of botnet time. This entire process is then repeated continuously until the
Simulation class determines that the necessary exit conditions have been reached.
There are two possible exit conditions for the simulation. The first is the desirable exit
condition, where a bot master command reaches less than the target percentage of the
botnet population. This exit condition signifies that the attempt to disable the botnet by
the sybils has been successful, as the capacity of the botnet to execute malicious activities
has been significantly reduced. The second exit condition is that the time limit has elapsed
without this target being reached, which in this case is deemed to be 24 hours of botnet
time. Once either of these conditions have been reached, the simulation has completed,
and as such the program terminates.
While this design implements the botnet protocol and behaviour described in Sec-
tion 4.2, it also allows other botnet protocols to be modeled. Other botnet peer-to-peer
protocols where the bots directly connect to each other, such as Conficker [14], can be
easily simulated by modifying the bot and sybil classes. Implementing file-sharing based
botnet peer-to-peer protocols, such as the one used by Storm [20], would also required mod-
ifications to the Botnet class, due to the fundamental differences in how these protocols
operate.
This botnet simulation framework is unique in that the focus is placed on attacking
the botnet, rather than having the botnet attack a target. Unlike other botnet simulation
tools, this allows the resilience of the techniques the botnet employs to be analysed. Such
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a tool is necessary in allowing sufficient understanding of how these botnet techniques
operate, and crucial in allowing the formation of countermeasures against such techniques.
Without being aware of how to deal with such botnet techniques, botnets will no longer
be disabled, and the botnet arms race will have been lost.
5.3 Bot and Sybil Behaviour
The behaviour of each bot object was modeled as close to that described in Section 4.2 as
possible. As such, each bot maintains its own list of peers that it knows, and a reputation
list of known peers when applicable. Upon powering on, it selects peers from these lists to
connect to, and attempts to establish connections until a desired number of connections
have been reached. Once the desired number of connections have been reached, the bot
no longer initiates connections but still accepts them until the connection limit is reached.
After each successful connection, the bots exchange fragments of their peer lists, and
integrate them into their own peer lists accordingly. Finally, when the bot shuts down,
it disconnects from each of the peers it was connected to, allowing them to form new
connections as a result.
While implementing this behaviour, as described in Section 4.2, was not an issue, the
values of variables involved were. The authors of the paper on which this peer-to-peer
botnet is based provided no indications of values for these parameters in the paper. After
further correspondence with the authors of the paper, they were unable to provide with
confidence suitable values for these connection parameters. As a result, these values had to
determined experimentally once the implementation of the botnet was completed, selected
based on how well they facilitated the reliable delivery of the bot master’s commands.
In order to improve the efficiency of the sybil peers, and model how they would be im-
plemented in an actual attack, a sybil controller was used. This controller was responsible
for managing which peer was connected to on each connection attempt, and to manage the
peers exchanged by the sybils. By iterating through each known bot on each connection
attempt, and by iterating through each sybil peer in the peer exchange, the effectiveness of
the sybils on the botnet could be maximized, as it maximizes the knowledge of the sybils
to the peers in the botnet. In addition, this removed the overhead of having each sybil
peer calculating and storing all these values individually.
One downside of this approach however was the maintenance of the shared peer list.
Due to the aggressive nature of the sybils, this list grew extremely quickly, containing
upwards of 90% of the botnet population within a few steps in early testing. As a result of
this list growing, so too did the time required to perform lookup and insert operations on
the list, something that is required after every sybil establishes a connection. This quickly
led to a severe performance bottleneck, especially once all botnet peers were known, as
this operation had essentially become useless.
The solution to this problem was to allow the sybil controller knowledge of all the botnet
peers, so that insert operations on this list never had to be performed. This however gives
the sybils an advantage that would not be available in a real world scenario, unless the
botnet had already been successfully crawled prior to the attack. Given the performance
53
5 Implementation
increase in the simulation as a result of implementing the sybil controller in this way, and
the fact that the controller very quickly learnt of the vast majority of the botnet population
anyway, this was seen as a justifiable trade off.
5.4 Measurements
The primary measurement to take in this experiment was what percentage of the botnet
receives the bot master’s command after its injection into the botnet. To effectively mea-
sure this, the process of actually injecting commands onto the botnet was used, repeated
multiple times to remove the effects of randomly selecting bots to initially send the com-
mand to. Each time, multiple bots were selected and directly given the command, and the
simulation run to allow the command to propagate throughout the network. At the end of
each run, the number of bots that received the command in proportion to the number of
bots online was recorded, and the result averaged across multiple runs. This measurement
was taken in specific intervals during the simulation both before and after the sybils began
attempting to disable the botnet, in order to record the effectiveness of the attack over
time.
In addition to the command propagation, other factors were recorded at specific inter-
vals. These included the number of bots online, the average number of connections of each
bot, the average size of the bot peer lists, the proportion of these connections and peer list
entries that were sybil peers, as well as the average number of connections held by the sybil
peers. This information was harvested simply by iterating through each bot, recording the
necessary information and then calculating the result for each of these statistics.
5.5 Limitations
Utilising Ruby for the implementation resulted in the simulation framework scaling poorly
to large botnet populations, as a consequence of the rapid development it allows. While
botnet populations of up to 10,000 peers were able to be comfortably simulated, going
beyond this value significantly increased the execution time and resources required. In
order to efficiently simulate botnets of larger populations, a lower level implementation
would be required, written in a programming language such as C. Given that the high level
implementation proved the usefulness of the simulation framework, such an implementation
could be an avenue for future work in this area.
The major performance bottleneck and consequent limitation in this simulation frame-
work was the result of the peer-to-peer protocol employed by the botnet. In the peer-to-peer
protocol, each peer keeps track of its own list of peers, and this peer list has no limit on
its size. This means that over the course of the simulation this list grows continuously
for each peer, resulting in more memory being used and the time taken to perform each
step increasing. While this is effectively a non-issue at small populations, at larger botnet
populations the effect becomes quite apparent. The effect is in fact exacerbated by the fact
that there are more peers interacting, meaning that there are more peer lists to maintain,
and more peers able to go into each peer list, making each of these peer lists even larger.
54
5 Implementation
As a result, the execution time and memory required to perform the simulation do not
scale well with botnet population size. This performance limitation meant that a limited
number of experiments could be performed on botnets of a realistic size, meaning that
more emphasis had to be placed on smaller test runs which could execute very quickly.
A solution to this situation could be the implementation of a limit of the peer list
size for each bot, or some alternate method of storing this information. With the former
approach, the problem is what the limit on this peer list should be, and what should
occur when new peers are received when the peer list has reached its limit. Given that
the botnet is allowed time to stabilise before the Sybils begin their attempt at disabling
the botnet, this could have severe implications on the way in which knowledge of the
Sybil peers spreads throughout the botnet. Should new peers be rejected, peers will not
establish connections to sybils, hampering the effectiveness of the attempt, while if new
peers replaced old peers, it would increase the chances of bots connecting to sybils, thereby
increasing the effectiveness of the attempt. Using an alternative means of storing these
peer lists could prove successful, but due to limitations on the time available, this was not
an area that was examined in depth.
Another limitation with the simulation is that it has not been implemented nor designed
such that it is parallelizable. Given the prevalence of multi-core CPUs, this could have
allowed a significant decrease in the time required to execute each simulation. One possible
approach would be to split the PacketQueue into multiple queues running in different
threads, each queue responsible for delivering packets to a different portion of the botnet.
However, once again due to time constraints this possibility was not able to be explored
in more depth. Instead, since the simulations were single threaded, multiple instances of
the simulation framework were simply run in parallel.
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This section describes the results obtained from running the botnet simulation, analysing
the effects that trust metrics, the botnet size, the percentage of permanently online ma-
chines and the proof of work solution time had on the resources required to disable the
botnet within 24 hours. These simulations were performed on small botnet populations
where possible, due to the significant amounts of time required to run the simulation at
larger populations.
6.1 Effect of Trust Metrics
Figure 7 shows the effect the use of the reputation systems and proof of work schemes
have on the resources required for sybils to disable the botnet in 24 hours. The graph
displays the resources required to disable four different botnets, one with only the basic
peer-to-peer protocol, one with the addition of a reputation system, one with the addition
of the proof of work scheme, and one with both the reputation system and proof of work
scheme.
The sybil resources are expressed as a percentage of the botnet’s total resources, which
consists of both bandwidth and computational resources. When the proof of work scheme
is not being used, these computational resources effectively go to waste, as they are not
the limiting factor in the sybils’ success. However, when the proof of work scheme is used,
these computational resources are the limiting factor as they are used in solving the proof
of work tasks. This method of measuring the sybils’ resources, which was discussed in
Section 4.5.1, applies to all graphs presented in these results.
As Figure 7 shows, the use of the proof of work scheme appears to have the most
dramatic effect on the amount of resources required to disable the botnet within 24 hours.
To disable the botnet when a proof of work scheme is not being used, 6% of the botnet’s
resources are required, compared to 18% of the botnet’s resources when a proof of work
scheme is used. A key aspect to note is that when proof of work scheme is not being used,
the limiting factor is bandwidth, compared to computational resources when the scheme
is being used. This means that not only does proof of work raise the amount of resources
that are required, it converts the requirements into a resource that is much more expensive
to obtain.
This hike in the resource requirements also affects the botnet in the absence of sybils, as
the proof of work scheme causes the command penetration to drop to approximately 90%.
The proof of work scheme decreases the rate at which bots can connect to each other, as bots
must spend time solving the proof of work tasks in order to form connections. This causes
reconnecting bots to take much longer to successfully connect to other peers, and lowers
the overall number of connections in the botnet. With a lower number of connections,
there is an increased chance that some bots may not receive bot master commands, and
this is demonstrated by the command penetration never exceeding 90% when the proof of
work scheme is used.
While the proof of work scheme appears to overall have had a beneficial effect on
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Figure 7: Command Penetration 24 hours after Sybil Activation for a botnet of 4000 bots
the botnet’s resistance to sybils, the reputation scheme has not. When comparing the
reputation system to the basic peer-to-peer botnet, the reputation system appears to make
the botnet more vulnerable to sybils. Instead of the 6% required for the basic peer-to-peer
botnet, the reputation system causes the amount of resources required to drop to 4%.
A similar phenomenon can be seen with the results of the botnets that use the proof
of work scheme. Although the same amount of resources are required to disable the two
botnets that use the proof of work scheme, the addition of the reputation system causes
the command penetration to drop more rapidly. It would seem that overall the reputation
system has a negative effect on the botnet’s resilience to the sybil attack, rather than a
positive one. This negative impact of the reputation system is explored in more depth in
Section 6.3.
6.2 Effect of Botnet Size
Figure 8 demonstrates how the amount of resources required to disable the botnet in 24
hours changes with botnet size. As was discussed in Section 5, simulation performance was
sacrificed in favour of development time. For this reason, the botnet of 40,000 bots was
the largest that was able to be simulated. This was found to be the point where execution
time began to exceed the period of botnet time that was being simulated, demonstrating
that the implementation was not suitable for such large scale simulations.
While the legend indicates that there should be four sets of data on the graph, there
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Figure 8: Resources Required to Disable Botnet in 24 hours
would appear to only be three. This is because the two botnets that utilised the proof of
work scheme required the exact same amount of resources to disable, which in this case
was 18%, and consequently were plotted on top of each other.
The results in Figure 8 show that the resources required to disable a botnet increases
linearly with size. In terms of the effect of each technique, the results confirm those
found in Figure 7, with the proof of work scheme increasing the resources required, while
the reputation system lowers the resources required compared to the basic peer-to-peer
botnet.
Although the results show that the resource requirements are perfectly linear across the
population sizes, this is unlikely to be the case. The smallest step in the sybil resources in
the experiments was 2%, which given that the reputation system and basic botnets took
4% and 6% respectively, is perhaps too large. However, given the execution time of the
simulation under larger populations, although desirable, such small variations was not a
feasible option.
Smaller variations in the sybil resources maybe have been able to differentiate the
resource requirements for the two botnets that employ the proof of work scheme. While
Figure 7 showed the the addition of the reputation system to the proof of work scheme
lowered the command penetration, it appears that it did not have an effect on the total
amount of resources required to disable the botnet across variations in size. This would
seem a counterintuitive result, as the reputation system lowering the command penetration
would suggest that it would also lower the resources required to disable the botnet, but it
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would seem this is not the case.
6.3 Effect of the Percentage of Permanently Online Machines
Figure 9 demonstrates the effect the percentage of permanently online peers has on the
amount of resources required to disable the botnet. As with Figure 7, the command
penetration for the botnet 24 hours after sybil activation is shown. Due to the way in
which the reputation system rewards not only correctly forwarding commands but also
availability, it was thought that the percentage of permanently online peers might impact
on the success of the reputation system. Since no data was available for this value, it was
assumed to be 1%. These results explore the effect of that assumption, by comparing the
basic and reputation system botnets at different values for the percentage of permanently
online peers.
It would appear that even at various percentages of permanently online bots, the rep-
utation system still has a negative effect on the command penetration of the botnet. The
exception is when 50% of the bots are always online, where the reputation system appears
to have had no effect on the command penetration at all. At this particular value for the
percentage of permanently online machines, the amount of resources the sybils have ap-
pears to have no effect. While the presence of the sybils lowers the command penetration,
this value stays constant even with increases in the sybil resources. If this were to stay
constant even at much higher levels of sybil resources, it would mean that the botnet is
unable to be disabled in this way.
A similar effect is seen when 10% and 25% of the bots are permanently online, although
the command penetration seems to vary randomly rather than stay constant. For reasons
unknown the addition of the reputation system seems to exacerbate this effect. In addition,
the reputation system seems to cause the command penetration to drop substantially at
higher amounts of sybil resources, particularly when 10% of the machines are always online.
Figure 9 indicates that the cause of the reputation system’s poor performance is not
the percentage of permanently online machines, but rather something else. The negative
impact of the use of the reputation system is quite severe, causing a botnet to always
require less resources to be disabled. These results, when combined with the other results
of the other experiments, seems to point towards this be a deficiency with the protocol,
rather than the parameters chosen.
One possible flaw could be the way in which peers whose reputation values fall below
the cutoff are dealt with. While these peers are removed from the reputation list, they are
not explicitly disconnected from, nor are they removed from the regular peer list. This
means that while sybils may be removed from the peer’s reputation list, they will stay
connected to the bot until it turns off. In addition, there is still a chance that the sybil
will be selected from the regular list, meaning that the reputation system is providing no
benefit against sybils at all. Although this could explain the reputation system’s failure to
protect against sybils, it does not explain making the botnet more vulnerable to sybils.
The use of the reputation list in addition to the regular peer list causes bots to be more
likely to reconnect to peers they have connected to before. This is effectively the goal of the
59
6 Experimental Results
Figure 9: Effect of the Percentage of Permanently Online Machines on Command Pene-
tration
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Figure 10: Effect of the Proof of Work Solution Time on Command Penetration
reputation system, as these peers are considered trusted and should therefore be connected
to more often, but this appears to be a hindrance rather than a benefit. It would appear
that connecting in this pseudo-deterministic way results in a network structure that is more
susceptible to sybil attack than a purely random network layout. Why exactly this is the
case however would require further investigation into the specifics of how the reputation
system affects the way in which the bots connect.
6.4 Effect of the Proof of Work Solution Time
Figure 10 shows the effect that variations in the proof of work solution time had on the
command penetration of the botnet. Similar to the other graphs, it shows the command
penetration of the botnet 24 hours after sybil activation for various values of sybil resources.
As observed in Figure 7, the proof of work solution time not only affected the amount of
resources required to disable the botnet, but the command penetration of the botnet in
the absence of sybils. In order to explore this phenomenon in more detail, the length of
the proof of work solution time was varied.
From Figure 10 it can be seen that increasing the proof of work solution time increases
the amount of resources to disable the botnet. This increase is quite significant however,
demonstrated by how increasing the solution time from 2 minutes to 5 minutes increased
the resources required by 10%, and by how increasing the solution time to 10 minutes meant
that the command penetration only just started to decline at 24%. At a solution time of
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20 minutes the command penetration still decreases with the increase in sybil resources,
indicating that this the botnet can still be disabled, just that significantly more resources
are required.
This relationship between the solution time and the resources required to disable the
botnet is a logical outcome. At a solution time is 2 minutes, 8% of the botnet’s resources
is the amount of resources required for the sybils to form sufficient connections to disable
the botnet within 24 hours. Although this proof of work solution time may increase, the
number of connections the sybils need to form in order to disable the botnet does not
significantly decrease. This means that by increasing the proof of work solution time, the
sybils require additional resources in order to form the same number of connections within
a 24 hour period.
In addition to increasing the amount of resources required to disable the botnet, in-
creasing the proof of work solution time decreased the command penetration of the botnet
in the absence of sybils. This can be explained by the fact that increasing the proof of work
solution time increases the time taken for bots to reconnect to the botnet. While even at a
solution time of 20 minutes approximately 90% of the botnet still receives a command, it
can be seen that if this solution time was increased too much the botnet would no longer
be able to function.
This essentially makes the value of the proof of work solution time a trade-off for the
bot master. Increasing this solution time results in a better resilience to sybils, at the
expense of less efficient use of the bot master’s resources, and decreasing this value has the
opposite effect. The best value to the bot master therefore relies on how long they believe
that increasing the solution time will increase the lifespan of their botnet. Given the effect
increasing the proof of work solution time has on the resources required to disable the
botnet, such increases could extend the lifespan of the botnet for a significant period of
time.
6.5 Summary
The result of these experiments indicates that the bot masters have a technique at their
disposal to make sybil attacks against peer-to-peer botnets much more resource intensive.
Not only did the proof of work scheme require more resources than the basic peer-to-peer
botnet, it required more computational resources, in addition to bandwidth. Increasing
the solution time for these proof of work tasks was shown to increase the resources required
even more. A secure implementation of this scheme in an actual botnet would have severe
consequences on the ability of the security community to disable the botnet.
The reputation system on the other hand made the botnet more susceptible to the sybil
attack. This was consistent across different botnet populations and different percentages
of permanently online peers, indicating that there is a significant problem in the design
of the reputation system. Given that the technique is specifically designed to prevent this
sort of attack, its failure to do so is a surprising result.
One positive result for the security community is that the amount of resources required
to disable such botnets increases linearly with size. While not the best possible result,
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it is still far superior to the resources scaling exponentially. The results also allow the
planning of how much resources will be required to disable such botnets should they be
implemented.
Overall however the results indicate that the techniques available to advance botnet
defences are improving significantly, demonstrating that the lead the bot masters hold in
the botnet arms race is increasing.
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7 Conclusion
As stated in Section 1.2, three major contributions have been presented in this disserta-
tion. These three contributions were the creation of the taxonomy of botnet defences, the
development of a botnet simulation framework, and an evaluation of the effect of trust
metrics on the resources required to disable a peer-to-peer botnet.
The taxonomy of botnet defence techniques in Section 3 highlighted the fact that bot
masters have numerous techniques available at their disposal for defending their creations
against external threat. Many of the current techniques bot masters employ have no known
countermeasures, and this has resulted in the many botnets currently active today. This
represents the current state of the botnet arms race, and demonstrates that the bot masters
are clearly leading. In addition, many of the techniques bot masters may implement in
the near future also have no known countermeasures, indicating that the bot masters are
capable of increasing this lead if they desire. The taxonomy indicates that significantly
more research is required in countering botnet defences, such that more botnets can be
disabled.
While the botnet simulation framework described in Section 5 proved to be a success,
it was not without some limitations. Although simulations on small botnet populations
were able to execute without issue, as the botnet population grew the performance started
to decrease. This however was not a result of design or implementation deficiencies, but
rather the result of implementing the framework in a high-level language. The simulation
framework was still suitable for performing experiments, just at slightly smaller popula-
tions.
In terms of the future techniques bot masters may employ, the reputation system and
proof of work scheme seemed to be the most likely candidates. However, the results of
the experiments in Section 6 showed that the reputation system had detrimental effect
on the botnet’s resilience to sybil attacks rather than a positive one. This was consistent
across multiple botnet populations and variations in the proportion of permanently online
peers, indicating a possible flaw in the design of the reputation system. As a result, the
reputation system no longer seems a suitable candidate for a technique that future bot
masters will implement.
The proof of work scheme on the other hand had a significant effect on the amount
of sybil resources required to disable the botnet. Not only did the proof of work scheme
significantly increase the amount of bandwidth resources required to disable the botnet, it
also caused the sybils to require significant computational resources. Increasing the solution
time for these tasks was found to increase the resources required to disable the botnet even
further. A cryptographically sound implementation of such a scheme could have serious
ramifications on the capability of the security community to successfully disable peer-to-
peer botnets.
In terms of the actual amount of resources required to disable these botnets, they
were found to scale linearly with size. Such a relationship allows the amount of resources
required to disable the botnet within 24 hours to be easily determined once the size of the
botnet is known. Determining the size of such botnets however is another issue.
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Combining the findings of the taxonomy and the simulations points towards a grim
conclusion for the botnet arms race. Not only do bot masters currently hold the advantage
in the botnet arms race, their lead is likely to expand through the use of techniques such
as the proof of work scheme. The sheer number of botnets in operation today serves as an
indication of just how significant this lead is. This suggests that the prospects of winning
the botnet arms race and eliminating the botnet threat are severely limited.
7.1 Future Work
The simulation framework utilised for the analysis of the effect of trust metrics on the
peer-to-peer botnets proved to be a success. However, performance did become a major
concern at larger botnet populations, and limited the number of experiments that were
able to be performed. This limitation could be rectified however by a developing a more
efficient implementation in a low-level language. Such an implementation would not only
allow larger botnet populations to be simulated, but would also allow experiments to be
performed much more rapidly. The framework could then even be expanded to include
the capability to simulate different botnet peer-to-peer protocols, such as that used by the
Storm botnet.
While the reputation system was shown to negatively impact the botnet’s resilience
to the sybil attack, the reasons why this is the case are not known. Further experiments
with variations of reputation system specific parameters could shed some light on the issue,
although a more efficient simulation implementation may be desirable first. Modifications
to the protocol could also be attempted, such as actively blocking further communication
with peers who have fallen beneath the cutoff value, or simply dropping open connections
to bots that fall below the cutoff. Since theoretically only sybils should drop below the
cutoff while still connected, this could have a significant impact on the ability of sybils to
disable the botnet. Other possible modifications could include removing the regular list
entirely, or changing the way in which reputation points are lost.
Perhaps the most important avenue for future work however is to determine improved
methods of countering the proof of work scheme. Should an actual botnet implement
this scheme, searching for implementation flaws would likely be the best avenue of attack.
Other techniques could be researched before then however, such as the effect of the sybils
intentionally generating instantly solvable proof of work tasks, or attempting to fill all of a
bot’s connection slots without ever solving a proof of work task. Should an actual botnet
begin to use this technique, successfully countering it will become a serious priority in
future botnet research.
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